THE END OF NOTICE: SECRETS AND LIENS IN COMMERCIAL
FINANCE LAW
Jonathan C. Lipson©
This article explores important recent changes in the way that we treat personal property in
commercial finance transactions. Among other things, these changes reduce or eliminate the obligation
to give notice of interests in personal property when it is used in commercial finance transactions (as,
e.g., collateral for a loan).
A principal purpose of notice-filing has been to deter the creation of secret liens, interests in property
that are neither recorded nor otherwise readily observable. Secret liens are universally castigated as
abhorrent.
Yet, two recent sets of legislative developments suggest that we may care much less about the
problem of secret liens than we might acknowledge. First, recent revisions to Article 9 of the U.C.C
(which governs many commercial finance transactions) tolerate secret liens as to such increasingly
important assets as data, intellectual property, bank accounts, and securities.
Second, states have recently begun to enact non-uniform legislation designed to promote “asset
securitizations.” This legislation gives fully-preemptive effect to the parties’ contracts, and would
therefore appear to displace rules on notice-filing that might otherwise apply. They effectively end the
obligation to give notice.
The article considers how we have come to diminish the role of notice-filing, and what that might
mean. I argue that tolerance of secret liens challenges a deeply-held intuition about the relationship
between property rights and notice obligations. This intuition enjoys both a new theoretical cache and a
long lineage. I also suggest that we have become increasingly tolerant of secret liens because we have
been seduced by a series of economic arguments about the alleged inefficiencies of notice-filing. I
consider and reject most (but not all) of the economic arguments as incomplete or speculative.
The article then suggests that notice-filing systems may perform at least two important informational
functions not fully considered by critics of these systems. First, they will act as proxy for the information
that might otherwise be generated within tightly-knit merchant communities. Second, they may have
important behavioral consequences both for those required to provide the notice and for the audience for
the information thus provided. The article therefore counsels caution in enacting legislation that would
diminish or dilute notice-filing in commercial finance transactions.
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THE END OF NOTICE: SECRETS AND LIENS IN COMMERCIAL
FINANCE LAW

One of the Ten Commandments of Mercantile Law is that an effective
[notice] filing system is the center pole that holds up the entire personal
property tent.1
[I]t is certainly observable that [notice] filing offices tend to collect a good
deal of dust between the visits of creditors seeking information . . .2
Commentators have wondered for some time just what it is we want the
[notice] filing system to achieve.3
Introduction
Pity the poor financing statement.
This much-maligned document was once the centerpiece of most important
commercial finance transactions. Until recently, to make generally enforceable
any loan or similar transaction involving personal property, this simple statement
identifying the borrower, the lender and the property involved had to be filed in a
public office designated by applicable law (usually Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code).4 If the form was properly completed and filed, and the
underlying contracts were executed, the lender’s rights in the borrower’s property
would be “perfected” – enforceable not only against the borrower but also against
anyone else seeking to stake a claim in that property, such as buyers, other
creditors or a bankruptcy trustee, should the debtor fail.
As a general matter, the function of the financing statement (formally known
as a “UCC-1”5) has not been in dispute.6 At least nominally, the UCC-1“put[s] a

1

James J. White, Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Ignorance and New Filing Rules,
79 MINN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1995).

2

John deJ. Pemberton, Jr. Notice Filing for Accounts Receivable, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
643, 652 & 664 (1948) (citation omitted).
3

Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 679, 705 (1995).

4

U.C.C. § 9-401(2000).

5

A form of financing statement as envisioned by U.C.C. § 9-521 is attached as Annex A.

6

As discussed in part III, the larger informational system of which the financing statement is a
part has been the subject of some controversy. Indeed, an entire symposium issue of the
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person on notice of the existence of a security interest in a particular type of
property so that further inquiry can be made . . . .”7 The financing statement has
thus been viewed as a potent antidote to the problem of secret liens, the ancient
conflict that arises whenever one party asserts an interest in property that is
neither recorded nor otherwise readily observable.8 Secret liens are universally
castigated. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed long
9
ago, “[s]ecret liens have always been repugnant to the law.” Karl Lewellyn more
10
colorfully equated the secret lien with “that rat in Denmark”
Minnesota Law Review was devoted to the question. See "Managing the Paper Trail":
Evaluating and Reforming the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1995).
7

Heights v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 463 Pa. 48, 342 A.2d 738, 743 (1975) (emphasis in original).
"The purpose of a notice-filing statute is to give protection to a creditor by furnishing to others
intending to enter a transaction with the debtor a starting point for investigation which will result
in fair warning concerning the transaction contemplated." TMMB Funding Corp. v. Associated
Food Stores, Inc., 136 A.D.2d 540, 542, 523 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (2d Dept.1988). See also Marine
Drilling Co. v. Hobbs Trailers, 697 S.W. 2d 831 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Waterfield v. Burnett (In re
Burnett), 21 Bankr. 752 (Bankr. N.M. 1982); Abney v. I.T.T. Diversified Credit Corp., 11 Bankr.
965 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).

8

See, e.g., Nunnemaker Transp. Co. v. United Calif. Bank, 456 F.2d 28, 36 (9th Cir. 1972)
((suggesting in dicta that there is “no risk of a secret lien” where there has been “compliance with
the notice filing provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code”)(citations omitted); Admor’s Office
World, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. (In re Admor’s Office World, Inc.), 1992 WL 350577, *2
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The Code seeks to protect against the secret lien and at the same time to
promote notice filing”)(citing Matter of Pasco Sales Co., Inc., 52 A.D.2d 138, 143, 383 N.Y.S.2d
42 (2d Dept.1974); Beneficial Finance Co. v. Kurland Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 32 A.D.2d 643,
645, 300 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (2d Dept.1969)); United States v. Birco Mining Co., Inc. (In re Birco
Mining, Inc.), 10 B.R. 545, 548 (Bankr. N.D. Ala 1981) (“The law decries a "secret lien," Corn
Exchange Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 63 S.Ct. 679, 87 L.Ed. 884, and notice filing is now an
accepted part of commercial law”).
As Professor Alces explained –
The filing system [] prevents pure debtor fraud -- the kind that the debtor commits without the
help of a collusive creditor by granting successive collateral interests in the same property
without notifying each secured party of the (prior) adverse claimants. This is the true secret
lien problem and, for some, it is the raison d'etre of the filing system. If the filing system did
not provide an effective means to avoid the risk of pure debtor fraud, there might not be any
remaining viable argument in favor of the filing system. So if there is to be a filing system, it
must reduce, if not eliminate entirely, this fraud risk.
See Alces, supra note 3, at 703.
9

Holt v. Albert Pick & Co., 25 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir. 1928) (“[n]o citation of authority is
requisite to support the proposition that [] a secret lien could not avail against an attachment or
execution creditor, not chargeable with knowledge or notice of its existence. . . . .”). See also In re
Reliance Equities, Inc., 966 F.2d 1338 (“’[T]he Bankruptcy Act abhor[s] secret liens....") (citation
omitted). In re Brownsville Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 463, 464 (3rd Cir. 1941) (characterizing
Pennsylvania as a State whose 'abhorrence of the secret lien' did not even admit of the palliative of
recording.”) (quoting Martin v. Mathiot, 14 Serg []); Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Williams,
37 F.2d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1930) (“Secret liens are repugnant to the law”); In re Nolan Motor Co.,
25 F.Supp.186, 189 (D.D.C 1938) (“The giving of a secret lien and the attempt to enforce such a
lien against the claims of creditors represented by the trustee in bankruptcy is repugnant not only
to the spirit but to the letter of the Bankruptcy Act.”); In re Collins Hosiery Mills, 19 F.Supp. 500,
502 (E.D.Pa. 1937) (“. . . the common law of Pennsylvania [] abhors a secret lien”); In re Stein, 17
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Yet, despite the chest-thumping, two recent sets of legislative development
suggest that we may care much less about the problem of secret liens than we
might acknowledge. First, Article 9 of the U.C.C. -- which governs many
11
commercial finance transactions, and which was revised effective 2001 -appears increasingly tolerant of secret liens. For a variety of reasons (some
intended, some perhaps not), secured transactions involving such increasingly
important assets as data, intellectual property, bank accounts, and securities will
in many cases be undiscoverable from the public record.
Second, and perhaps more controversially, several states have recently
enacted non-uniform legislation designed to promote asset securitizations.12 At
least in theory, a securitization differs from a traditional loan because the “debtor”
in the securitization “sells” property, rather than encumbers it. Sometimes called
“structured financings,” transactions with these general contours were apparently
central to much of Enron’s activities.13 The drive to enact facilitation statutes
stems in large part from a concern that courts may second-guess the contracted-

F.Supp. 587, 591 (E.D.Pa. 1936) (“[] the law abhors secret liens and the like.”); In re J.F. Grandy
& Son,146 F. 318, 323 (D.S.C. 1906)(a “secret lien would be abhorrent to equity . . . .”); In re
Noack, 44 B.R. 172, (Bankr.E.D.Wis. 1984) (“In the final analysis, the facts of each particular
case shall govern, always bearing in mind the Uniform Commercial Code's abhorrence of secret
liens.”)(citing J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, § 22-3 at 883 (2d ed. 1980)); In re Loop Hosp. Partnership, 35 B.R. 929, 936
(Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1983) (“The UCC has an "abhorrence of secret liens.") (citing WHITE AND
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UCC, Section 22-3 at 883 (2d Ed.1980)). For a
general discussion of secret liens, see Julian B. McDonnell in 1 Peter F. Coogan et al., SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ¶¶ 1.01-1.06 (1999).
10

See Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 730 (1939).

11

Revised Article 9 has been enacted in all states, and in most went into effect July 1, 2001. See
NCCUSL—Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts, at http://www.nccusl.org/
nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca9.asp. I occasionally denote revised Article 9
“Rev. § 9-[xxx];” and former Article 9 “F. § 9-[xxx].”

12

See, e.g. 73 DEL. LAWS 214; 2001 Del. ALS 214; 2001 Del. HB 348; codified in Title 6,
Chapter 27A, of the Delaware Code. Other states that have recently enacted similar statutes
include Alabama, ALA. CODE 1975 § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (2002); Louisiana, LA. R.S. 10:9-109(e)
(2002); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9A-102 (2002); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1109.75 (West 2002); & Texas, TX. BUS. & COM. § 9.109(e) (2002).
13

There has already been some effort to distinguish securitizations from the types of transactions
in issue in Enron. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose
Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309. 1314 (2002). Schwarcz has argued that
“unlike in Enron, structured transactions [securitizations] typically transfer substantive risk away
from the company originating, or sponsoring the transaction . . . .” Steven L. Schwarcz,
Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3-4
[hereinafter, Schwarcz, Complexity]. As discussed in section [], infra, the securitization
facilitation statutes would insulate these transactions from all other applicable rules, including
those on notice-filing, even if they had none of the distinctive virtues identified by Professor
Schwarcz. See also Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform:
Dead or Dormant?, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101 (2002) (discussing Enron’s use of
securitization) [hereinafter “Lipson, Enron”].
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for character of the transaction, and treat it not as a sale, but as a financing.14 If
so, the property purportedly sold would remain available for all of the debtor’s
other creditors to share if the debtor went into bankruptcy.
These statutes solve this problem by giving full preemptive power to the
underlying contracts (e.g., the sales documents). If they mean what they say,
these statutes should create an enormous exception to all state-law-based noticefiling systems, including those contemplated by the UCC. They effectively end
the obligation to give notice.
This article considers how we have come to diminish the role of notice-filing
in so many instances, and what that might mean. Section I examines the deeply
held intuition that property rights turn on public notice obligations as reflected in
both recent scholarship and long history. At a theoretical level, property rights
come with notice obligations. The recent work of Thomas Merrill and Henry
Smith, for example, suggests that these obligations appear designed to reduce the
transaction costs associated with discovering and respecting property rights.15
Historically, notice-filing appears to have developed in part as a response to the
fragmentation of community that followed in the wake of the industrial
revolution.
Section II explains in detail how, despite this intuition, secret liens can arise in
a variety of common transactions, including those in which increasingly important
types of assets such as data and intellectual property are involved. Section II also
explains how the securitization facilitation statutes work to defeat notice-filing
regimes.
Section III of the article explains how we have lost sight of the link between
property rights and notice-filing obligations in commercial finance transactions.
In essence, we have been seduced by a series of arguments about the economics
of commercial finance and notice-filing.16 Economically, the arguments go,
14

Securitization has, in Professor Mann’s view, “produced a powerful impetus for legislation
ensuring that those transactions receive favorable treatment in bankruptcy.” Ronald J. Mann, The
Rise of State Bankruptcy-Directed Legislation, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1805, 1816 (2004).
15

See note [], infra.

16

While Revised Article 9 and the securitization facilitation statutes do not directly cite this body
of literature, it would appear that the economic challenge to notice-filing has influenced these
recent developments. An overarching goal of Revised Article 9 was to promote economic
efficiency by making secured transactions easier (and theoretically cheaper) to engage in. The
Reporters for the committee that drafted Revised Article 9 explained it thus:
[M]any . . . provisions of Revised Article 9 reflect the Drafting Committee's effort to achieve
more than merely "better," more "efficient," "equitable," or "reasonable" rules to govern
secured transactions. An overarching goal of the revisions was to provide in the transactional
context enhanced certainty and predictability from the inception of transactions. This certainty
can facilitate transactions even though an understandable rule with predictable consequences
may be normatively suboptimal.

See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of U.C.C.
Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357, 1363 (1999). See also Harry
Sigman, Twenty Questions About Filing under Revised Article 9: The Rules of the Game Under
New Part 5, 74 CHI-KENT. L.. REV. 861 (1999) (Revised Article Nine's provisions are intended to
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notice-filing regimes impose direct and indirect costs of compliance that fail to
produce corresponding informational benefits. Unfortunately, the economic
arguments are incomplete and lack empirical support.
Part IV suggests that there are other ways to understand the role of noticefiling. These understandings are rooted in the ways that information functions in
commercial communities and the behavioral consequences of notice-filing
systems. These other views of notice-filing suggest that we should think carefully
before doing away with it.
I. Property, Notice and Commercial Finance Law
A strong intuition in our law links property rights to public notice obligations.
This intuition enjoys both theoretical currency and an ancient lineage. Strong
claims about this intuition have been made by, among others Richard Epstein,17
Carol Rose,18 Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson.19 Most recently, Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith have elaborated on this intuition in what may be
characterized as a neoclassical approach to property law theory.20 They argue that
property rights are unique because they create “universal duties” that “are
broadcast to the world from the [property] itself.”21 Historically, linking property

"make new document filing more efficient, transparent, and uniform."). See also Patrick A.
Murphy, Revised Article 9 in Bankruptcy Cases, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE COMMERCIAL LAW
AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI ORDER NUMBER A0-00HP (Sept. 2003) (“The
purpose of Revised Article 9 is to simplify commercial transactions and, in the process, to make
them more efficient and less likely to be upset in bankruptcy cases.”).
17

See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1355-56 (1982).

18

See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 78-79
(1985).
19

See, e.g., Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of
Property 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 292 [hereinafter, Baird and Jackson, Uncertainty]; Douglas G. Baird
& Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35
STAN. L. REV. 175 (1983) (hereinafter, Baird and Jackson, Scope]; Douglas G. Baird, Notice
Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J.L.STUDIES 53 (1983) [hereinafter, Baird,
Ostensible Ownership].
20

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith,
Optimal Property]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 833–42 (2001) [hereinafter, Merrill & Smith, Interface]; Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357
(2001)[hereinafter, Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics]. Henry Smith has elaborated on some of their
work in Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1105 (2003). A recent article critical of certain aspects of the Merrill and Smith approach – especially as
it pertains to verification – appears in Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract,
and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 373 (2002). As discussed below, Hansmann and Kraakman nevertheless claim that there
exists a strong link between notice and property rights, a claim which current trends would appear
to undermine.
21

Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 20.
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rights to notice goes back at least as far the Greeks, for whom the “horos” gave
posted notice of an interest in real property.22
This section summarizes the development of the intuitive link between
property rights and notice obligations, especially as expressed in commercial
finance law. “[O]ne of the most firmly rooted doctrines of the common law,”
Grant Gilmore has observed, was “the protection of creditors against undisclosed
interests in property.”23 This link is the foundation of our abhorrence of secret
liens. Satisfying the link between notice and property axiomatically neutralizes
the problem of secret liens. Thus, if we can understand where the relationship
between property and notice comes from, and why it persists (at least in theory),
we should have some background sense of the problems created by secret liens.
A. Neoclassical Property Theory and Information Costs
The link between property rights and notice obligations is enjoying something
of a renaissance among property theoreticians, especially in the work of
Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith.24 The heart of this neoclassical
22

As Benito Arrunada explains –
[H]oroi contained the essential data of the encumbrance (always, the nature of the horos as
security, and more often, but not always, the existence of a written agreement, the name of the
creditor, and the amount of the debt) and, in some cases, the name of the person who kept the
document of the transaction, supposedly to make it possible for third parties to collect more
information. This system was one of the first to make an hypotheca possible--namely the use
of land as collateral without temporarily transferring ownership or possession to the lender.

Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. ECON & ORG. 401 (2003).
23

1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965), § 3.2, at 67. & ,§ 8.7,
at 274 (“In the history of our security law there has been one constant factor: whenever a common
law device has been covered by a statute, some form of public recordation or filing has been
required as a condition of perfection of the security interest.'”). Gilmore was a principal drafter of
the U.C.C. As Peter Coogan, another prominent participant in the development of the U.C.C,
explained:
A history of chattel security could well be written in terms of the 400-year struggle by debtors
and their secured creditors to create security interests of various sorts in the debtors’ property
without affording notice to buyers or other creditors, and the attendant demands by unsecured
creditors generally for some kind of notice when all or part of the debtors’ assets become
subject to security interests. The parties favoring secrecy have, for the most part, been the
losers.
Peter F. Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel
Security Laws, Including “Notice Filing,” 47 IOWA L. REV., 289, 294, n. 8 (1962).

24

See citations in note 20, supra. It should be noted that Merrill and Smith are not the first to make
many of these claims. They also find voice in the work of Jeanne Schroeder and J.E. Penner. See,
e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 23-31 (1997); J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of
Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 713 n.8 (1996); JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE
VESTAL AND THE FASCES: PSYCHOANALYTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
FEMININE AND PROPERTY (1996); Schroeder, Surrealism supra note []; Schroeder, Death and
Transfiguration, supra note []; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique
of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1994); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Vestal
and the Fasces: Property and the Feminine in Law and Psychoanalysis, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 805
(1995); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's Imagery of Personal Property as
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position is that property differs from other common law rights at tort or contract
because property deals with a limited set of in rem rights that are good against
“the world.” Although there are traces of this approach to property in the work of
Richard Epstein and Carol Rose25, Merrill and Smith take the argument a step
further, and find a deeper link between notice and property rights. They argue
that a unique feature of property is that property creates “universal duties” that
“are broadcast to the world from the [property] itself.”26 Only if something is
“marked in the conventional manner as being owned,” they write, will “we know
that we are subject to certain negative duties of abstention with respect to that
thing.” 27 Because the thing has been “marked” “we know all this without having
any idea who the owner of the thing actually is.”28 Even those who criticize
neoclassical conclusions about the character and development of property rights
nevertheless agree that “third-party information costs are central to the law’s
regulation of property rights.”29
1. The Numerus Clausus
Neoclassical views about the notice-function of property are rooted in the
“numerus clausus,” the idea that property rights come in a fixed and closed
number of forms. “Property law,” Merrill and Smith argue, “requires that the
parties adopt one of a limited number of standard forms that define the legal
dimensions of their relationship; generally speaking, these are mandatory rules
that may not be modified by mutual agreement.”30 The number (numerus) of
property forms is, in the vernacular, closed (clausus) because “common-law
courts will not enforce an agreement to create a new type of property right.”31
The numerus clausus appears to be a well-articulated feature of many civil law
jurisdictions.32 In the common law, however, its role is more opaque. Although
courts and lawyers are characterized as hostile to the numerus clausus, Merrill and
Smith nevertheless contend that they “routinely abide by the principle, even if
they are unaware of its existence.”33 For example, as to estates in land, “courts
enforce the numerus clausus principle strictly. . . . The menu of forms is regarded
the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55 (1994). More recent additions include Adam
Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003).
25

See supra notes [] & [].

26

See Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 20.

27

See id.

28

Id.

29

See Hansmann & Kraakman, Property, supra note 20, at 374.

30

See Merrill and Smith, Interface, supra note 20, at 776.

31

See Merrill and Smith, Optimal Property, supra note 20, at 5.

32

See id. at 4-5 (in civil law countries the numerus clausus is “widely acknowledged by
commentators as being a substantive limitation on the definition of property”).
33

See id., at 8. See also id at 6 (“Scholars and judges tend to react to manifestations of the
numerus clausus as if it were nothing more than outmoded formalism.”).
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as complete and not subject to additions.”34 With respect to personal property,
Merrill and Smith claim, the list is even narrower.35 The chief exception, they
argue – the one area in which courts will respect novel claims of property rights –
is in the intellectual property arena. Here, “judicial creativity in fashioning new
intellectual-property interests has been sanctioned” in the recognition of rights of
publicity and on the misappropriation of information.36
The principal explanation for the (sub rosa) vitality of the numerus clausus has
been economic, oriented around the inefficiency that stems from the excessive
fragmentation of rights (or rights holders).37 Merrill and Smith take the economic
explanation one step further, arguing that we restrict property forms not out of
concerns about fragmentation, per se, but about information costs associated with
the creation of excessively idiosyncratic property rights (“fancies”).38 Thus,
Merrill and Smith believe that the need for the numerus clausus “stems from an
externality involving measurement costs: Parties who create new property rights
will not take into account the full magnitude of the measurement costs they
impose on strangers to the title.”39
The information costs of idiosyncratic property forms (they use the example
of a one-hour time-share in a wrist-watch40) thus explain for Merrill and Smith the
underlying basis of the numerus clausus. “One way to control the external costs
of measurement to third parties is through compulsory standardization of property
rights.”41 The standardization of property forms imposed by the numerus clausus,
according to Merrill and Smith,
reduces the costs of measuring the attributes of such rights. Limiting the
number of basic property forms allows a market participant or a potential
34

See Merrill and Smith, Optimal Property, supra note [], at 13.

35

Id. at 17. (“Personal property is restricted to fewer available forms of ownership than real
property.”).

36

Id. at 20.

37

Merrill and Smith are concerned chiefly with the fragmentation of rights themselves. A related
problem is the fragmentation of rights amongst numerous rights holders. See, e.g., Michael A.
Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 79, 87 (2001); Michael A.
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 621, 633–40 (1998).
38

Merrill and Smith refer to idiosyncratic property forms as “fancies,” after the opinion in Keppell
v. Bailey 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834)(novel forms of property cannot "be devised and
attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner."). Merrill and Smith, Optimal Property,
supra note 20, at 26, nn 102-104.
39

Merrill and Smith, Optimal Property, supra note 20, at 26-27.

40

Id. at 27. Note that U.C.C. Article 2A would appear to recognize the time-share in the watch as
a lease. U.C.C. § 2A-103(j) defines a lease as “a transfer of the right to possession and use of
goods for a term in return for consideration.” There is no apparent reason why the “term” of the
lease couldn’t be every Monday for one year. It might be fanciful – and inefficient – but it is
permissible.
41

Id. at 33.
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violator to limit his or her inquiry to whether the interest does or does not
have the features of the forms on the menu. Fancies not on the closed list need
not be considered because they will not be enforced. When it comes to the
basic legal dimensions of property, limiting the number of forms thus makes
the determination of their nature less costly. The "good" in question here
might be considered to be the prevention of error in ascertaining the attributes
of property rights. Standardization means less measurement is required to
achieve a given amount of error prevention. Alternatively, one can say that
standardization increases the productivity of any given level of measurement
efforts.42
There is, on this view, an “optimal” number of property forms, and this
number is determined by the information costs associated with excessively
idiosyncratic forms of property. On the one hand, costs in error and measurement
would be lowest, Merrill and Smith observe, in a highly regimented system,
which recognized only a single, simple form of property (such as the fee simple
absolute).43 However, frustration costs arising from stymied creativity would be
quite high. On the other hand, a system of unfettered customization of property
forms – pure contract – may have low frustration costs (how can you be frustrated
if the law recognizes anything you do?) but high costs of verification and
measurement. Both the parties that created the fancy, and others who might try to
discover what it is and what rights are held in it, will expend large sums in
ascertaining and managing these rights. The social cost of limitless customization
of property rights is simply too great. The optimal level of customization – the
number and type of fancies permitted by the numerus clausus – is somewhere in
between, where all classes of information cost are the lowest.
Merrill and Smith’s view of the existence of and rationale for the numerus
clausus is not without critics. In a recent article, Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman question the neoclassical assertion that the list of property forms is
closed or that there may be an “optimal” number of types of property forms.44
Rather, they argue that “the law’s limitations on property rights take the form not
of standardization in a discreet number of well-defined forms, but rather of
regulation of the types and degree of notice required to establish different types of
property rights.”45 Non-standard property rights are recognized by the common
law, they argue, but “are simply governed by highly unaccommodating
verification rules that place a heavy burden on the holder of the right to provide
notice to third parties.”46 “The optimal standardization theory makes little sense
when applied at the category level,” they suggest.47 By this, they seem to mean
42

Id at 33-34 (footnotes omitted).

43

Id, at 39-40.

44

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 20.

45

Id. at 374.

46

Id. at 399.

47

Id. at 401.
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that a highly idiosyncratic form of property right in one category – say,
intellectual property – should not create meaningful information costs for property
in another category, such as real estate.48 Even within categories, increasing the
number and complexity of rights will not necessarily increase costs significantly,
“assuming the same verification rules are used” for types of rights within the
given category.49
2. Property as Information
Perhaps the key point about the numerus clauses is informational: The forced
standardization of property forms creates a kind of short-hand which, in turn,
reduces information costs. “When we encounter a thing that is marked in the
conventional manner as being owned,” Merrill and Smith write, “we know that
we are subject to certain negative duties of abstention with respect to that thing.”
50
Because the thing has been “marked” “we know all this without having any
idea who the owner of the thing actually is.”51 Property law creates “universal
duties” that are “broadcast to the world from the thing itself.”52
Because property rights are, in the neoclassical conception, “good against all
the world,” property law essentially “presents a massive coordination problem.”53
If the legal system allowed in rem rights to exist in a large variety of forms,
then dutyholders would have to acquire and process more information
whenever they encountered something that is protected by an in rem right. If
in rem rights were freely customizable--in the way in personam contract rights
are--then the information-cost burden would quickly become intolerable. Each
dutyholder would either incur great costs in informing herself, or would be
forced to violate property rights wholesale, defeating the benefits of security,
investment, and planning that these rights were meant to secure.54
For Merrill and Smith, the numerus clausus is the silent but stealthy force that
“reduce[s] the widespread information-gathering and processing costs imposed on
third parties by any system of in rem rights.55 In other words, simplicity (of a
48

Id.

49

Id. Nor does the numerus clausus account for the creation and destruction of property forms
over time. Michael Heller, for example, has observed that property law in Blackstone’s time
recognized a variety of forms that have since fallen away. Heller, Boundaries supra note [], at
1176, n. 62 (“In Blackstone's time, the numerus clausus was much more numerous, populated with
incorporeal hereditaments such as corodies and advowdsons that no longer exist. . . . . Over time,
these forms were pared down to the streamlined list that exists today.”)(citations omitted).

50

See Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 20 at 359.

51

Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 20, at 359. “Marking” was at least one of the
problems encountered by Twyne in his eponymous case. 3 Co. Rep. 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star
Chamber 1601). Twyne’s Case is discussed in part I.B []-[], infra.

52

Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 20, at 359.

53

Id. at 387.

54

Id. at 387 (footnote omitted).

55

Id. at 387.
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sort) reduces the cost of informing the world that a property interest exists.
Although Hansmann and Kraakman disagree with the neoclassical conclusion
that the form of property rights is (and economically-speaking) must be limited,
they whole-heartedly endorse the link that Merrill and Smith make between
property rights and notice (which they call “verification”). Indeed, Merrill and
Smith err, they argue, by suggesting that notice is required to facilitate
communication among persons who transact in property rights. Rather,
Hansmann and Kraakman argue, limitations on the types of property “facilitate
the verification of ownership of the rights offered for conveyance.”56 Notice and
property rights are correlated because “[t]he degree of notice required and the
extent to which the law affirmatively facilitates the giving of notice vary across
different types of property rights according to the utility of the partitioning and
the costs of giving notice.” In other words “[b]ecause the benefits of partial
property rights are often low and the costs of verifying these rights are generally
high, property law necessarily takes an unaccommodating approach to all but a
few basic categories of partial property rights.”57
Neither Merrill and Smith nor Hansmann and Kraakman express a strong
opinion about how property-information should be disseminated. Merrill and
Smith seem to believe, for example, that notice-filing systems generally are cheap
sources of information about property rights.58 They offer as an example of this
the Article 9 financing statement system which, they claim, “allowed the
loosening of the earlier quite strict limits on the types of security interests
permitted.”59 But they are not insensible to the possibility that there may be other,
cheaper ways to disseminate comparable information, such as via electronic
transmission.60
There may be problems with the neoclassical position. First, it appears
tautological. It may be true that property rights are those with low information
costs. But how do we know something is property in the first place, if we do not
have the information? What, in other words, came first – the property rights or
our knowledge of them? Second, this model seems most fully explanatory with
respect to tangible property. If there is nothing to “mark” – because the res is an
intangible – it is not clear how universal knowledge is possible. The “world”
knows very little about my bank account, but most would agree that it is my
property.61 Conversely, many things that have very low information costs –
56

Id.

57

Id. at 375.

58

See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Property, supra note 20, at 40 (“registers of interests in real
property, that is, recording acts . . . lower[] the costs of notice . . .”).

59

Id. at 42 (footnote omitted).

60

Id. At 42 (“Notice is arguably easier to furnish (if not to process) when, for example, rights to
digital content are being transferred, and notice of restrictions and other features of rights
transferred are technologically not difficult to provide.”).

61

I do not, of course, claim that a deposit account creates an interest in specific funds. I am also
mindful of the fact that Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995) undermines the
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archetypal human relationships -- are not property. Virtually anyone who sees me
with my daughter will deduce our relationship. It will be “universally broadcast”
from our behavior, but no one would say that either of us has a property interest in
the relationship, or in one another.
Third, and as developed in the balance of this article, it fails to account for the
legislative trend toward eliminating notice-filing, which would seem to make
property rights more difficult and costly to discover.
B. A Short History of Notice in Commercial Finance Law
Yet the core intuition – that property rights create notice obligations – is
powerful. Much of the power of the intuition comes from its lineage.
Historically, information about property was signaled by possession. This may
have made sense in a simpler world. But as societies became more complex and
disaggregated, community structures could no longer be reliable sources of
information about a debtor’s property. As increasingly devious transactions
occurred in increasingly sophisticated forms, notice-filing became proxy for the
information (and controls) that community might otherwise have provided.
1. Possession as Notice
Historically, possession was viewed as the basis of property rights,62 and this
was as true of the security interest (“pledge”) as any other property interest.63 If
creditor A took possession of debtor B’s flock of sheep to secure B’s debt to A, at
least in theory, there would be no doubt in the minds of those asserting an interest in
B’s property about B’s rights in the sheep: To all appearances, he had none. And,
conversely, where B did have possession, it would be reasonable for creditors or
purchasers to conclude that he did, in fact, have title or some other equally important
set of rights (e.g. a lien). Possession was property. Or, perhaps more accurately, the
signal sent by possession was said to justify the conclusion that the possessor had a
“property interest” in the thing possessed.

idea that the deposit account is property when the debtor/depositor is bankruptcy. There, the
Court upheld the exercise of an administrative freeze on a deposit account, notwithstanding the
automatic stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code that prohibits most creditor actions. Id.
at 21. But if the deposit account is not “property” of some sort then no security interest in it is
possible under Article 9 since, by definition, security interests are interests in “personal property
[which] secures payment or performance of an obligation.” U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (2003).
62

See Epstein, supra note []; Rose supra note []. Or, in the immortal words of English play write
Colley Cibber (1671-1757), “Possession is eleven points in the law.” COLLEY CIBBER, WOMAN'S
WIT, Act 1.
63

“The legal system’s original method of providing [information about ownership] was to give
primacy to possession. At common law, a debtor’s possession of personal property assured a
prospective creditor that the debtor could give him an unencumbered interest in that property.”
Baird and Jackson, Possession and Ownership, supra note 19, at 180 (footnoted omitted).
According to Baird and Jackson, this was because “possession has been viewed as the best
available source of information concerning “ownership” of most types of personal property.” Id.
(Citing Twyne’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601) and statute 13 ELIZ., CH. 5 (1570)).
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Perhaps the most famous articulation of the link between notice and possessory
property rights appears in Clow v. Woods.64 In Clow, a tanner (Hancock) conveyed
to creditors Clow and Sharp mortgages on his vats of hides and tanning
equipment. The creditors neither took possession of this personal property
collateral, nor recorded the mortgage. The debtor’s former business partner (Poe)
sued for his share of the value of the firm, obtained a judgment, and sent the
sheriff to execute on the same hides and equipment. The secured creditors sued
the sheriff seeking to recover the proceeds of the sale of this property, arguing in
substance that their mortgage had priority over Poe’s execution lien.
Unfortunately for the secured creditors, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had no
desire to enforce their mortgage, since the court viewed it as fraudulent in law, if
not in fact.65
Clow turned in significant part on the informational problem created by the
separation of property right from possessory fact. Judge Gibson reasoned that the
“secrecy” of the mortgages (security interests) would harm other creditors of the
debtor, Hancock, because these other creditors would (mistakenly) rely on the
apparent value of his hides and equipment in deciding to lend to him.66 His
ownership of this property, ostensibly free and clear of the rights of all others,
would induce unwitting (perhaps unsophisticated) creditors to extend unsecured
credit, at their peril:
[A] creditor ought not to be suffered to secure himself by means that may
ultimately work an injury to third persons,” Judge Gibson opined . . . . Where
possession has been retained without any stipulation in the conveyance, the
cases have uniformly declared that to be, not only evidence of fraud, but fraud
per se. Such a case is not inconsistent with the most perfect honesty; yet a
court will not stop to inquire, whether there be actual fraud or not; the law will
impute it, at all events, because it would be dangerous to the public to
countenance such a transaction under any circumstances. The parties will not
be suffered to unravel it, and show, that what seemed fraudulent, was not in
fact so. Would it be less against sound policy to suffer a vendor to remain in
possession, under an agreement to that effect expressed in the conveyance, and
thus to create a secret [e]ncumbrance on his personal property, when to the
world he appears to be the absolute owner, and gains credit as such.67
Clow thus articulated what came to be known as the problem of ostensible
ownership – the making of credit (or other investment) decisions in reliance on
the (misleading) appearance that a debtor has rights in property by virtue of
physical possession.
64

5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819).

65

Id. at 283, 288. The court held that the mortgage transaction was a per se fraud against creditors
and was void under the statute of 13 Elizabeth.

66

Clow id at *4 (The contract between the debtor and creditors was a “secret matter[] between the
parties themselves, and can afford no notice to creditors.”).

67

Clow at *5 (Gibson, J.).
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Some have questioned whether ostensible ownership creates much of a
problem.68 Professor Mooney, for example, has argued that creditors (or others)
are unlikely to rely (reasonably or otherwise) on the mere fact that a debtor
possessed certain assets when making a credit or other investment decision.69
Mooney’s argument centered principally on proposals to extend notice-filing rules
to personal property leasing transactions.70 Mooney successfully argued that
notice-filing would add nothing to such transactions because sophisticated
creditors either already knew that the debtor leased its property, or did not care
one way or the other.71 Because ostensible ownership problems by definition
involved misplaced reliance on a debtor’s property, and creditors rarely relied in
“unreasonable” ways, Mooney concluded that “[p]erhaps there is no real 'problem'
at all.”72
While possession technically remains a viable method of creating and
enforcing property interests in commercial finance transactions,73 it would appear
68

See Charles Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9
Filing: A Critique of Proposals To Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 683,
725-38 & n 160 (1988) (critiquing claim that possession creates an “ostensible ownership”
problem).
69

Mooney, id. at 740 (“Although hard empirical data remains elusive, a review of Code cases
dealing with priority disputes between lessors and third parties supports the argument that
mistaken and detrimental reliance on lessees' possession of equipment is not
commonplace.”)(footnote omitted).

70

See generally Amy Boss, The History of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practitioner and Scholar
Alike, 39 ALA. L. REV. 575 (1988).
71

Mooney, supra note 68, at 785-88.

72

Id. I note that personal property leasing cases sometimes have important implications for noticefiling. The so-called recharacterization cases hold generally that a lease that was, in substance, a
secured financing may be recharacterized as such and, if the lessor (read: secured party) failed to
give adequate notice, it would lose its priority to a bankruptcy trustee). See, e.g., Duke Energy
Royal, LLC v. Pillowtex Corp. (In re Pillowtex, Inc.), 349 F.3d 711 (3d Cir. 2003)(setting forth
criteria for determining whether transaction is a “true lease” or “disguised financing.”); PCH
Assocs., 949 F.2d at 595-97 (citing PCH Assocs. v. Liona Corp., 55 B.R. 273 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985); In re Independence Village, Inc., 52 B.R. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985). U.C.C. § 9-505
now explicitly contemplates (and permits) the filing of precautionary financing statements. In at
least some states, that might be a good idea, as a sale-leaseback that is not recorded may be treated
as a fraudulent transfer. California Civil Code § 3440, for example, makes a sale-leaseback void
as against creditors of the transferor unless a UCC financing statement is filed in the office of the
California Secretary of State prior to the sale of the equipment and a notice of the intended transfer
is published not less than 10 days before the transfer.
73

U.C.C. § 9-313(c) provides that a secured party may take and perfect a possessory security
interest in certain types of collateral in the physical possession of some third party (i.e., not the
debtor) so long as the third party has agreed that it holds the collateral for the benefit of the
secured party. See U.C.C. § 9-313(c). Possessory security interests are not only permitted with
respect to most tangible collateral, but are actually required to perfect a security interest in money
(i.e., currency). U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(3). The possessory security interest is presumed to perform the
informational functions one might ordinarily associate with notice-filing, since it is an exception
to the general rule that a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest. U.C.C. §
9-310(b) (6). It is also considered a proxy for the contract that creates a security interest, a written
(or electronic) security agreement. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(B) & (C).This is somewhat surprising,
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that Mooney is at least half right, since it is simply not clear what possession
“means.”74 As any first-year law student can tell you, possession is a highly elusive
concept. We do not “possess” most of the things that we claim to possess in ordinary
language. Professor Schroeder has elaborated on this point, noting that the
enormous number of potential, complex property relationships, coupled with the
development of fictitious legal entities such as corporations (which may have and
convey interests in property) make physical custody an extremely poor signal of
any information about either the property itself, or its “ostensible” owner.75
The ambiguity of possession also infects the creditor’s side of things. For
example, even if a lender has actual physical possession, we still do not know what to
make of other creditors of this (the possessory) creditor. After all, it is entirely
conceivable that A (B’s creditor) may take possession of B’s property to secure B’s
obligation. But it is at least theoretically possible that A may have its own creditors, or
purchasers, or what have you (C).76 Why should C be any less gullible than B’s
creditors? Doesn’t A’s possession (of B’s property) signal to A’s secondary
stakeholders (such as C) the very same thing that B’s possession would signal to B’s
creditors, etc?77 How would A’s creditor (C) verify the absence of B’s equity (if
any) in the collateral?
given that the U.C.C. provides no guidance about what “possession” might mean for these
purposes. The U.C.C. “does not define ‘possession.’” U.C.C. § 9-313 cmt 3. The U.C.C. “adopts
the general concept [of possession] as it developed under former Article 9.” Id. While former
Article 9, § 9-305, certainly contemplated the creation and perfection of security interests by
secured party possession, it also said little about what possession might have meant in this context.
See U.C.C. § 9-305(2000).
74

It is this uncertainty that led Professor Phillips to observe that “business people look to written,
not possessory evidence of ownership. And this view leads generally to recognizing filing, but not
possession, as a means of notice.” David M. Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to
Filing Under Article 9--Part I, 59 B.U.L.REV. 1, 35 (1979).

75

See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. MARY L. REV. 455,
486-87 (1996) [hereinafter Schroeder, Realism] (“Regardless of what has been historically
assumed, contemporary property practices suggest that, today, physical custody provides very,
very little (if any) information about ownership.”). See also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and
Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed “Property,” 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1281 (1996)
[hereinafter Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration]. Professor Schroeder thus argues with some force
that possession in commercial law is at best a metaphor for what she calls “sensuous grasping.”
Schroeder, Surrealism, supra note [], at 455. Yet, as Schroeder observes, it is a metaphor that fails to
serve commercial law well. It is simply not meaningful to view transactions in intangible property –
which is increasingly where the real value is -- as like a physical conveyance, a simple “farmer’s
transaction.” Schroeder, Surrealism, supra note [], at 492 (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales
on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 732 (1939)). For example, investment property (e.g., stocks
and bonds) often exists in complex networks of computers which are owned (and perhaps “possessed”)
by firms, which are then linked in complex, pyramidal broker-dealer relationships. See Prefatory Note,
U.C.C Art. 8 (1994) (discussing evolution of securities holding systems).
76

See Baird and Jackson, Uncertainty, supra note 19, at 307.

77

Baird and Jackson dismiss this problem of “repledge” as being “largely a theoretical one.” Id. at
307. Presumably they were at the time unaware of the basic functioning of the securities markets.
Professor Kettering has thoughtfully demonstrated that this problem is not merely theoretical in
the context of securities transactions, especially by and among broker-dealers. See Kenneth C.
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Yet, assertions about what the law should be based on assumptions about how
people process information turn out to be very difficult to sustain. It seems fairly clear
that in smaller and more tightly knit communities, possession may well have been an
effective signal. Otherwise, it seems unlikely that possession could ever have been an
acceptable means of distributing property rights. If so, Clow is ultimately wrong in
result, even if it may be correct in its policy concerns. If, as seems likely, Hancock’s
creditors – and in particular, Poe, the creditor and former business partner -- knew or
had reason to know that Clow and Sharp had a mortgage on Hancock’s property, what
value would notice-filing (or creditor possession) have added? How did Poe (or
anyone else) rely unreasonably on Hancock’s (the debtor’s) possession?
Possession undoubtedly sends an ambiguous signal, but that is only half the story.
As discussed in Part IV.B below, we are just beginning to develop theories about how
human beings process information and form judgments in the presence of ambiguity.
In any case, it would appear that information has complex affects on both the audience
for, and the providers of, information about property, none of which have been fully
accounted for by those who dismiss the problem of ostensible ownership.
Perhaps the ultimate problem with the possessory security interest has only
indirectly involved information. This is the practical problem arising from the
fact that, as the economy grew in depth, breadth and complexity, possessory
security interests became neither useful nor appealing to those engaged in increasingly
sophisticated mercantile transactions.78 If true to form, the debtor could not possess or
make use of property held by the secured creditor. Hancock, the tanner in Clow,
would not have been able to produce the leather goods that were presumably his stock
in trade and the sale of which would make it possible for him to repay the loan. If not
true to form, there remained the distinct possibility of ex post judicial nullification.
For manufacturers, this meant that their equipment could not secure a loan; for
merchants, the same prohibition limited the value of their inventory. Nor could future
interests secure present loans. Nor could intangible rights serve as collateral. And so
on. Possession thus became a speed-bump on the road to increasingly complex,
disaggregated property rights. Increasingly dynamic uses of property would render
possession vestigial at best, and misleading at worst.79
2. Notice Systems
Given these problems with the possessory security interest, it is not surprising that
pressure developed to find an alternative. The alternative was notice filing.80 Linking
the right to enforce a nonpossessory interest in property (e.g., a security interest) to
Kettering, Repledge and Pre-Default Sale of Securities Collateral Under Revised Article 9, 61 U.
PITT. L. REV. 45 (1999).
78

Baird and Jackson, Uncertainty, supra note 19, at 308.

79

See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM, 9-10 (1956)
(“[P]revailing nineteenth century attitudes in fact made private property pre-eminently a dynamic,
not a static institution.”).
80

At least originally, however, it was not considered to be a particularly good one. Professor
Gilmore observed that “[o]riginally filing was looked as merely an alternative, a less desirable
alternative, to possession taken by the secured party.” Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.1, p. 462
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publicly filed notice of that interest has had a long and complex career. While noticefiling may have served a number of purposes over time, one undoubtedly
involved preserving the link between property rights and notice-obligations.
Since notice-filing systems exploded with the disaggregation of community
during the industrial revolution, it may also be that notice-filing developed as a
proxy for the information that community would once have provided to creditors.
(a) The Roots of Notice-Filing – Recordation, Fraudulent Conveyance and
Sign-posting
Separating property from information about it – conveying property
information in some way other than possession – well precedes the modern
notice-filing systems we have today. Indeed, even while Clow might have
counseled that possession was the only (or principal) method of creating an
effective security interest in personal property, real property rights were being
reified in recordation systems that would be the forerunner for the notice-filing
systems that became ubiquitous in the 19th century.
In England, for example, recordation systems developed with respect to real
property, and were used as a matter of choice81 or custom.82 In colonial North
America, real property recording systems performed several different functions.
Certain communities in Massachusetts, for example, may have used recording and
acknowledgment rules to limit the admission of new members of the community
or to control improvements to property.83 More frequently, it appears that
81

See John Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 617, 620 (1931)
(“Prior to the Norman conquest there seems to have been a system of voluntary registration of land
deeds in monasteries”). Even where not voluntary, Professor Bowers reports that they may have
been easily circumvented. See James W. Bowers, Of Bureaucrats' Brothers-in-Law and
Bankruptcy Taxes: Article 9 Filing Systems and the Market for Information, 79 MINN. L. REV.
721, 722-23 (1995). The 1535 English Statute of Enrollments, which required recordation of a
“bargain and conveyance” of real property, was in fact a disguised taxation device. (citing 27 Hen.
8, ch. 16 (Eng.)). It was, in his view, one which often failed because lawyer simply paper around
the transaction. Bowers, supra at 731. See also Hanna, supra note [], at 619 (discussing Statute of
Enrollments).
82

In a 1907 issue of Green Bag, Joseph H. Beale, Jr. suggests that borough custom in England
required the registry of deeds to real property, and might have influenced the settlers in
Massachusetts and Virginia. See Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Origin of the System of Recording
Deeds in America, 19 GREEN BAG 335, 338 (1907). The custom of London, for example, was said
to be as follows:
The persons that sealed the deed must go before the Lord Mayor, or the Recorder and one
Alderman, and make acknowledgement that the same is their act and deed; if a wife be a
party, she is to be examined by them, whether it was done with her full and free consent,
without any kind of compulsion; in testimony of which the Lord Mayor or the Recorder and
Alderman set their hands to it, for which each may demand 4d, and the attorney’s fee for the
judgment is 2d. Afterwards the deed must be delivered to the clerk of the Inrolments who at
the next Hustings will cause the proclamation to be made thereof according to the customs of
the court.
Beale, supra, at 338 (quoting Bohun, Privilegia Londini, 241).

83

Id. At 336-37 (citing CAMBRIDGE TOWN RECORDS, vol. ii. Pp. 4, 10; BOSTON RECORD
COMMISSIONER’S REPORTS, vol. iv., p. 8 & vol. ii, p. 5).
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recordation was viewed as a way to address the problem of fraudulent conveyance
– a conveyance intended to place property out of the reach of creditors.84 For
example, in 1640, both Jamestown85 and the Massachusetts court86 enacted rules
providing that a nonpossessory interest in real property (title or mortgage) would
be treated as fraudulent unless publicly recorded.87
The problem of fraudulent conveyance appears to have had a significant
influence on the development of notice-filing rules, and provides some insight
into the historic role that community might play in all of this. Perhaps the classic
case of fraudulent conveyance was Twyne’s Case.88 There, one Pierce was
indebted to Twyne and to another creditor. “In secret,” however, Pierce conveyed
all of his property to Twyne in satisfaction of the debt. Despite the conveyance,
Pierce nevertheless continued to act as if the property remained his, including by
marking and selling his sheep as if they were his, and not Twyne’s.89 In avoiding
84

Beale, supra note [], at 335 (citing Hening’s Statutes, vol. I, p. 227). See also Mark DeWolfe
Howe, The Recording of Deeds in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 29 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1948).

85

Id.

86

Id. at 337. The Massachusetts rule provided as follows:
For avoyding all fraudulent conveyences, & that every man may know what estate or interest
other men may have in any houses, lands or other hereditamants they are to deale in, it is
therefore ordered, that after the end of this month no morgage, bargaine, sale, or graunt
hereafter to bee made of any houses, lands, rents, or other hereditamants shalbee of force
against any other person except the graunter & his heires, unless the same bee recorded, as is
hereafter expressed.”

I Records of Massachusetts 116.
Perhaps foreshadowing the streamlined notice requirements of the UCC, the ordinance further
provided that “it is not intended that the whole bargaine, sale, &c. shalbee entered, but onely the
names of the graunter & grauntee, the thing & the estate graunted & the date; and all such entryes
shalbee certified to the recorder at Boston.” Id. As discussed below, the modern UCC-1 financing
statement requires only a cursory recitation of the debtor (grantor), secured party (grantee) and
brief description of the collateral. U.C.C § 9-503(a). Hanna also suggests that colonial law
embraced recordation as a response to the problem of fraudulent conveyance. See Hanna, supra
note [], at 620 (“”England has influenced American law makers in the drafting of recording
statutes …. as a result of the statutes of fraudulent conveyance and reputed ownership.”) (citing 13
Eliz.. c. 5)
87

Professor Howe uncovered certain amendments to Massachusetts’ statute suggesting that
recording was required only where a grantor (i.e., debtor) retained possession following a
conveyance. See Howe, supra note [], at 4 (“the provision in the Code of 1648 makes it
abundantly clear that recording would thereafter be required only if the grantor remained in
possession.”). This suggests that, contrary to Beale’s view, discussed in note [] supra, the
Massachusetts system provided only a limited model from which the current system might have
developed.

88

3 Co. Rep. 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). The Star Chamber was enforcing the
Statute of 13 Elizabeth which provided that transfers with the 'intent [ ] to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors and others' were void, provided for recovery of the 'whole value of . . . goods and
chattels' transfered, to be shared by the Crown and aggrieved parties (such as creditors), and
provided for criminal sanctions against the parties to the transfer. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570).
89

3 Co. Rep. 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 811 (Star Chamber 1601).
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(undoing) the conveyance, the Star Chamber reasoned that “a secret transfer is
90
always a badge of fraud.”
One way to understand fraudulent conveyance was as an affront to community
norms. The statute that Twyne’s Case enforced – the Statute 13 Elizabeth c. 5 –
was enacted in part to deal with debtors who would remove themselves and/or
their property from the community once it became apparent that they could not
satisfy their debts. 91 As Professor Flint explains –
Overburdened debtors in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries frequently
transferred all their lands and goods to their friends in trust for use of the
grantor through fictitious sales, fled to one of the numerous sanctuaries where
the king's courts' power did not govern, lived luxuriously from the income of
the property transferred until the creditor accepted payment of a small portion
of the debt and released the remainder, then returned, and had back their
property.92
Recordation systems appear to have developed, in part, as an informational
proxy for possession which could deter or correct the problems of fraudulent
conveyance and secret liens. Although these systems existed even before the
Revolution,93 they began to flourish later, in the early part of the 19th century
with a view to preventing or remedying problems like those in Twyne’s Case.94
Recording was viewed as a means of deterring the actual or constructive fraud
90

Professor Mooney, and others, have argued that Twyne was a case chiefly about fraud and not,
as Baird and Jackson claim, about ostensible ownership. See Mooney, supra note 68, at 727 & n.
166. However that may be, the problem of fraudulent conveyance differs in some respects from
the problem of secret liens. At least historically (as in Twyne’s Case) a fraudulent conveyance
involved a transfer of property after a debt was incurred and not satisfied. Placing the property out
of reach of the creditor was the chief evil in such cases. Secret lien cases, however, often involved
a transfer of property prior to a debt being incurred. The problem of fraudulent conveyance is thus
largely ex post, while the problem of secret liens may be ex post or ex ante. Yet the essential
informational problem is the same in both. The actual secrecy of the transaction in Twyne’s Case,
and the presumptive secrecy of the transaction in Clow, appear to have been as troubling as any ill
intent in either (to evade creditors).
91

Professor Mooney maintains that the Statute of Elizabeth was “intended in large part as a
revenue measure.” Mooney, supra note 68, at 726, n.162 (citing 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 61b, 61c, at 89-93 (rev. ed. 1940)).

92

See George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History: The Fraudulent Myth, 29 N.M. L.
REV. 363, 380 (1999) [hereinafter, Flint, Fraudulent Myth] (citations omitted).

93

See Flint, Fraudulent Myth supra note [], at 363, n. 5. See also George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured
Transactions History: The Impact of Textile Machinery on the Chattel Mortgage Acts of the
Northeast, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 303 (1999); George Lee Flint, Jr., The Secured Transactions
History: The Northern Struggle to Defeat the Judgment Lien in the Chattel Mortgage Era, 20 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter, Flint, Northern Struggle].
94

See Gilmore, supra note [], at §§ 2.1 & 2.2 (discussing history of chattel mortgage acts as
response to problems of fraudulent conveyance); compare Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note [],
at 367 (“This study importantly eliminates Gilmore's implication of the nonpossessory secured
transaction as a fraudulent transaction.”). For purposes of this article, it is not necessary to resolve
whether nonpossessory secured transactions were or were not fraudulent. The ultimate questions
are why public notice systems took hold, and whether they continue to make sense.
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presumed to be at the heart of the non-possessory property interest. To the extent
that fraudulent conveyance was a transgression of community norms, therefore,
the compulsory disclosure of information became a method of regulating that
which the community could not.
These systems bloomed with the industrial revolution, and its insatiable
demands for liquidity. As Professor Gilmore explained:
The unprecedentedly rapid expansion of industrial facilities created and
equally unprecedented demand for credit. The financing institutions which
were the source of credit naturally desired security for the loans . . . . As
industrialization progressed, personal rather than real property came to be the
principal repository of wealth. The mortgage on Blackacre would not longer
be enough to support the merchant’s insatiable demand for credit and the
banker’s demand for security. Nor would the medieval institution of pledge
suffice to take up the slack . . . [industrial] property which could not be
pledged because it had to be used in the borrower’s business represented a
nearly inexhaustible source of prime collateral for loans. The story of how the
equipment and the rolling stock and the stock in trade came to be available as
collateral is essentially the story of personal property security law in the
nineteenth century.95
Yet, while growing industrialization in the 19th century may have sought
increasingly efficient methods of creating liquidity, it would appear that
commercial finance statutes of that era were anything but simple. First, the
recording systems did not, strictly speaking, require notice filing. Rather, being
rooted in the real property recordation systems, they usually called for the
recording of elaborate documentation, including the filing of the mortgage itself
and sometimes ancillary materials, such as affidavits and acknowledgments of
good faith and consideration.96 These additional documents were, in Professor
Gilmore’s estimation, “self-serving,” and reflected “the deep-rooted nineteenth
century suspicion that a [non-possessory] mortgage on personal property was in
all probability a species of fraudulent conveyance.”97
Second, because there were several different independent security devices,
there were several different independent recording systems.98 Because lenders
frequently had to avail themselves of several different forms of security, they
would have had to comply with several different filing systems. While this would
presumably have increased the incidence of innocent mistakes, it is not clear that

95

See Gilmore, supra note []. at § 2.1, p. 25. Of course, Professor Gilmore also observes that the
same pressures that led to a wide variety of complex alternatives to the pledge were not replicated
in England, where commercial needs were addressed “in an altogether simpler fashion.” Id.
96

See, e.g., Coogan, supra note [], at 291; Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.2, p. 466.

97

Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.2, p. 466.

98

See Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.1, p. 463 (“The typical pre-Code pattern included separate
filing systems for chattel mortgages, for conditional sales, for trust receipts, for factor’s liens, and
for assignments of accounts receivable.”).
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it resulted in more or (more importantly) better information on which creditors
and other investors could rely.
This tendency to confuse quantity of information with quality persisted into
the early 20th century, reaching an apex of sorts with the enactment of the factors’
lien acts. These acts often required both notice filing and the posting of signs on
debtors’ doors. The prototype for this sort of law was the New York Factors’
Lien Act,99 enacted after some political skirmishing in 1911.100 As enacted, the
bill provided that -Liens upon merchandise or the proceeds thereof created by agreement for the
purpose of securing the repayment of loans…made upon the security of said
merchandise …shall not be void or presumed to be fraudulent or void as
against creditors or otherwise, by reason of want of delivery to or possession
on the part of the lienor, whether such merchandise shall be in existence at the
time of the creation of the lien or shall come into existence subsequently
thereto…provided there shall be placed and maintained in a conspicuous place
at the entrance of every building…at which such merchandise…shall be
located…a sign on which is printed…the name of the lienor and…provided
further that a notice of the lien is filed…101
Duplicative notice – filed and posted – was justified on informational grounds.
Assemblyman (later Governor) Alfred E. Smith argued in support of the Factors’
Lien Act that “[a]ll that the bill does is to substitute public notice for actual
possession of the goods.”102 Notice – by filing and sign-posting -- was, in Smith’s
words, “a form of constructive possession of the goods.”103 If one believed that

99

N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1911, ch. 326, § 1, amended by N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1931, ch. 766, N.Y. SESS.
LAWS 1935, ch. 690, N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1943, ch. 635, N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1954, ch. 594, as
amended, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 45.
100

The Factors’ Lien Act was initially vetoed in the year that it was introduced in New York
(1910). See Robert M. Zinman, Dominion and the Factor’s Lien: Does Section 45 of the New
York Personal Property Law Abrogate the “Dominion Rule”?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 59, 70
(1961). The history of the initial veto and subsequent modification and enactment of the Factors
Lien Act is somewhat confused. Peter Coogan indicates that Hughes vetoed the legislation
because it lacked a provision requiring sign posting. Coogan supra note [], at 294, n 8. Professor
Zinman and several other authors he cites suggest that the Act originally contained only the signposting requirement, and not the additional requirement of notice-filing. See Zinman supra. The
weight of authority would appear to be on Professor Zinman’s side. In any case, the important
point is not the legislative history of the Act, but as discussed throughout this article, the role that
public notice played in its enactment (or not). I should note, however, that sign-posting as a
particular method of rendering security interests enforceable was for a brief period popular with
state legislatures, and then flamed out. Problems with sign-posting and the factors’ liens acts in
general are discussed in a symposium issues of Law and Contemporary Problems. See 13 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROB. [] (1948).
101

N.Y. Sess. Laws 1911, ch. 326, 1.

102

Zinman, supra note [], at 70 (citations omitted)

103

Zinman, supra note [], at 70.
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possession was a meaningful method of conveying information about property,
one might then accept the idea that notice-filing was at least as effective.104
Factoring is a good example of how notice-filing became proxy for
information that a community might otherwise have generated about a debtor’s
property. Factoring began as a form of consignment sales transaction:105 remote
manufacturers (often garment makers) would deliver goods to factors in the cities,
who would sell the goods and remit proceeds to the manufacturer.106 So long as
the factor had possession, it appears that the factor also had a lien.107 Problems
arose for factors, however, when the manufacturers began to retain possession of
their finished goods in warehouses they owned or leased in the sales markets,
while factors continued to provide financing, principally by purchasing the
receivables that would be generated when the merchandise was sold.108 Without
possession of the goods, the factor would lose its common law lien.
Because these transactions were not covered by the recording statutes then in
force, the parties had to develop some way to establish the factor’s nonpossessory
lien on the manufacturer’s goods in the event the manufacturer went bankrupt.
The method chosen by the community of factors and merchants was “sign
posting.” For example, in Ryttenberg v. Shefer,109 a case that arose before
enactment of the New York Act, the parties assigned the manufacturer’s
warehouse lease to the factor, and a sign was posted at the entrance to the storage
floor, indicating that the premises had been “annexed” to the factor.110 Despite
expert testimony to the effect that this was the industry’s way of giving public
notice of a factor’s lien, the court concluded there that the sign was “indecisive”

104

It should be noted that not everyone shares this belief. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note [], at 6
(“By providing generally for possession either to constitute the exclusive or preferred means of
perfection or to alternate with filing, Article 9 follows the premise that possession satisfies the
function of perfection. [Yet] possession both fails to satisfy the equitable basis for the preferential
effects of perfection and imposes costs....”).

105

See Herbert R. Silverman, Factoring: Its Legal Aspects and Justifications, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 593 (1948). Silverman has suggested that, broadly understood, factoring well
preceded the law of the United States, and was apparently part of Roman commerce. See
Silverman, supra at 593.
106

See Silverman, supra note [] at 593. Factors differed from brokers because the factor was said
to be entrusted with the merchandise, and would apparently absorb the loss in the event the
customer ultimately failed to pay. Id. at 593 (citing Parons on Contract 100 (5th ed. 1905).

107

See Zinman, supra note [], at 65 (citations omitted). See also Kruger v. Wilcox, Ambler 252,
27 Eng. Rep. 168 (Ch. 1755) (holding at common law that factor had a general lien on the goods
and products of his principal in the factor’s possession). The common-law possessory lien was
later enacted by the New York Legislature as N.Y. Sess. Laws 1830, ch. 179.

108

Zinman, supra note [] at 66-67.

109

131 Fed. 313 (1904)

110

131 Fed., at 320. The sign stated “Shefer, Schramm & Vogel, Annex.” Shefer was the factor.

Id.

C:\inetpub\ wwwroot\results\4381-text.native.1091721321.doc; 8/5/2004 11:50 AM

The End of Notice

Page 23 of 74

because the premises did not in substance belong to the factor, and the factor
could therefore have been barred by injunction from the premises.111
Cases like Ryttenberg called for a legislative response, which came in the
form of the New York Factors’ Lien Act. As noted above, New York may have
been willing to permit factors to retain nonpossessory liens on merchants’
inventory, but only if public notice of the interest was given. Sign posting was
one way this notice was to be given. Yet sign-posting was not, by itself,
apparently sufficient notice of the property interest in question. As originally
proposed, the New York act required only sign posting, and not the additional
step of notice-filing. For this reason, Charles Evans Hughes, then-governor of
New York,112 vetoed it in 1910. Without notice-filing, he said, the Act “’would . .
. facilitate secret liens and fraudulent transactions.’”113 Once notice filing was
added, Hughes signed the bill into law.
Sign-posting as required by the Factor’s Lien Act would have a short-shelf life
as a method of conveying property information in commercial finance
transactions. In 1954, New York amended the Factor’s Lien Act to eliminate the
sign-posting requirement.114 The reasons for eliminating sign-posting would
sound familiar to us, today. The proponent of the amendment, Assemblyman
Stanley Steingut, argued that sign-posting was “completely old-fashioned, in that
it presupposed that credit grantors make a personal examination of the premises of
the credit seeker. As a matter of fact, credit grantors rely upon financial
statements and upon credit reports issued by . . . credit agencies . . . .”115
This suggests that community norms about the generation of information have
historically been important in deciding what information should be conveyed, and
how. While sign-posting may at one time have conveyed important signals about
relationships between things and people, it became increasingly clear that the sign
told the community little of value. The sign became, in Professor Zinman’s
words, a “superfluous nuisance.”116 Worse, while it may have provided little
useful information to the merchant community, it did give information to others
who may have had no legitimate reason to know about the debtor’s finances, such
as customers, competitors and employees. And, of course, there was always the
possibility that the unscrupulous debtor might remove the sign on the eve of
bankruptcy, thereby exposing the lender to the risk that it would effectively lose
its entire property interest. The sign, like possession before it, impeded the
development of richer, and more complex, commercial relationships.

111

Id.

112

And, from 1930 to 1941, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Vol. 1 1383-84 (3d ed. 2000).
113

See Silverman, supra note [], at 599 (quoting statement of Hughes) (citations omitted).

114

N.Y. Sess. Laws 1954, ch. 594.

115

Zinman, supra note [], at 83, n. 117.

116

Zinman, supra note [], at 83.
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(b) Notice-filing
While sign-posting may have withered away, notice-filing survived. Indeed,
it flourished, and continued to abstract away from the real property recordation
model which preceded it. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, promulgated in 1933,
“popularized the idea that for certain kinds of transactions,” such as those
involving inventory or accounts receivable, “it is not essential for all of the details
of the transaction to be spread upon the public record so long as the record gives
an indication where an interested party might inquire to learn whether or not
particular collateral of the indicated class or type is subject to the perfected
security interest.”117 The drafters of the U.C.C. picked up on this theme. Until
recently, notice filing was the dominant means of rendering a nonpossessory security
118
interest in personal property enforceable against third parties.
While highly
important transactions and types of collateral are effectively exempt from notice-filing,
giving notice remains an important method for perfecting a security interest. 119
Today, if notice is required at all, it will be given in one of two general ways. If
some registry already exists with respect to the type of property in question, Article 9
“steps back” to require that notice of the security interest in that type of property be
perfected by giving notice in the existing registry.120 But where another registry does
117

Coogan, supra note [], at 314-15. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1933, permitted the filing of a
“statement of trust receipt financing” of the following form:
The entruster,..............................................................whose chief place of business within this
state is at ............................................................................................, [or who has no place of
business within this state and whose chief place of business outside this state is
at.......................................................................................] is or expects to be engaged in
financing under trust receipt transactions the acquisition by the trustee,
.................................................................................whose chief place of business within this
state is at....................................................... of goods of the following description:
[coffee, silk, automobiles, or the like.]
[Signed] Entruster
[Signed] Trustee.
U.T.R.A. § 13(2).
This form can be seen as an ur-UCC-1, a simple notice of the pre-UCC equivalent of the nonpossessory security interest.
118

See Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.1, p. 463 (“As nonpossessory security interests become
more familiar, filing comes to be looked on not merely as an alternative to possession but as the
exclusive method of perfection.”). See also William C. Hillman, What’s in a Name: The U.C.C.
Filing System in the Courts, 45 OKLA L. REV. 151 (1991)(“the primary method of perfection
[under former Article 9 was] by the filing of a financing statement/”). The rules on notice in
prerevision Article 9 appeared principally in U.C.C. §§ 9-401 – 9-407 (2000).
119

See U.C.C § 9-310(a).

120

See UCC §§ 9-311(a)(1); 9-310(a). UCC § 9-311 provides that a financing statement is not
effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to “a statute, regulation, or treaty of the
United States whose requirements for a security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a
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not exist – and that may well be true much of the time – the security interest will be
perfected by filing a UCC-1 financing statement in the state of the debtor’s location.121
The UCC-1 is – as set forth in Annex A -- a simple form (paper or electronic) that sets
forth the debtor’s name, the secured party’s name, and a brief description of the
property subject to the security interest.122 The financing statement may also set forth
certain other items of information about the debtor, including its organizational type
and identification number (if any) and its address.123
The financing statement system may thus be seen as an articulation of the link
between property rights and notice obligation that arises when other means of
gathering information about a debtor (e.g., its community) are unavailing. As Baird
and Jackson have observed “[notice f]iling systems work because the legal rules
provide not only a benefit to a person who desires to acquire a property right but
also a corresponding responsibility. One is obliged to stake one’s claim in the
lien creditor with respect to the property,” preempts the general rule contained in section 9-310
that a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest.
The Official Comment to U.C.C. § 9-311(a) explains that an example of such a statute is 49
U.S.C. § 44107, for civil aircraft. Section 44107 establishes “a system for recording (1)
conveyances that affect an interest in civil aircraft of the United States” including “leases and
instruments executed for security purposes, including conditional sales contracts, assignments, and
amendments.” 49 U.S.C. § 44107(a) (1994). Section 44108 sets forth a limited rule of priority,
providing that until recorded under § 44107, a security interest in civil aircraft “is valid only
against—(1) the person making the conveyance, lease, or instrument; (2) that person's heirs and
devisees; and (3) a person having actual notice of the conveyance, lease, or instrument.” Id. §
44108. Although “no conveyance or instrument affecting the title to any civil aircraft is valid
against third parties without notice of the sale until such conveyance or instrument is filed for
recordation with the F.A.A.,” Air Vt., Inc. v. Beech Acceptance Corp. (In re Air Vt., Inc.), 44 B.R.
433, 437-38 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) (citing South Shore Bank v. Tony Mat., Inc., 712 F.2d 896, 897
(3d Cir. 1983)), Article 9 has nevertheless been used as a gap filler. See id. at 436-37 (applying
buyer in ordinary course rules of F. § 9-307 to sale of federally-titled civilian aircraft); see also
Pers. Jet, Inc. v. Callihan, 624 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Former Article 9 to fill void in
Federal Aviation Act). Other federal statutes that might preempt Article 9’s filing system include
the Ship Mortgage Act, and federal law governing security interests in rolling stock 49 U.S.C. §
11301(a) (1994). See Drabkin v. Cont’l Ill. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Auto
- Train Corp.), 9 B.R.
207 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1981).
An especially important category of collateral here will be copyright, and perhaps other types
of intellectual property. See also Jonathan C. Lipson, Remote Control: Revised Article 9 and the
Negotiability of Information, 63 OHIO ST. L. J 1327 (2002) [hereinafter, “Lipson Remote
Control”]; Jonathan Lipson, Financing Information Technologies: Fairness and Function, 2001
WIS. L. REV. 1067, 1104-1122 [hereinafter “Lipson, Information Technologies”]. As discussed
below, the recent decision in World Auxiliary Power provides some clarity about the scope of
federal law in this context, but may also create other problems. [CITE AND CROSS
REFERENCE]
121

U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-307. 9-310 & 9-501. Generally speaking, a corporate (or other “registered
organization) debtor will be “located” in its state of formation (e.g., a Delaware corporation is
located in Delaware, even if it has no physical presence in that state). See generally Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Article 9 Filing System: Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should be the
Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REV. 577 (1995).

122

U.C.C. §§ 9-503 & 9-521.

123

U.C.C. § 9-516(b).
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filing system so that future parties will be able to find it.”124
Ironically, it appears that the true force of notice-filing has come not from its
informational value but from the penalty that would befall the secured creditor whose
notice was defective. When a debtor entered bankruptcy, a trustee could exploit these
errors and avoid transactions in which notice was flawed. This power, sometimes
called the “strong-arm power” was needed, Congress indicated, “to prevent the evil
of secret liens.”125 In 1910, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act then in force
to expand the bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers.126 Congress was concerned
127
that cases like York Mfg v. Cassell paralyzed bankruptcy trustees trying to
recapture for the estate property that had been conditionally assigned in
unrecorded transactions.128 In response to York Congress amended the Bankruptcy
Act to provide that bankruptcy trustees “shall be deemed vested with all the
rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable
129
Congress reasoned that an “unrecorded instrument [of
proceedings . . . .”
conveyance] . . . which would have been void in the state courts had the property
been . . . levied upon by attachment or execution from a state court” should be
ineffective (“void”) as against a bankruptcy trustee.130
Eradicating secret liens remains the goal of the strong-arm power. Thus, the
1973 Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, which
led ultimately to the current Bankruptcy Code, observed that “[o]ne of the
essential features of any bankruptcy law is the inclusion of provisions designed to
invalidate secret transfers made by the bankruptcy prior to the date of the filing of
petition.”131 Although the Bankruptcy Code has been through several major
revisions since the early part of the 20th century, the strong-arm power remains
essentially intact, and is today found in section 544(a)(1).132
124

Baird and Jackson, Uncertainty, supra note 19, at p. 312.

125

45 Cong. Rec. 2275 (1910).

126

See H.R. Rep. No. 61-511, at 6-7 (1910).

127

201 U.S. 344 (1906).

128

Id. at 352. The Court reasoned in York Mfg that because the bankruptcy trustee “stands simply
in the shoes of the bankrupt . . . he has no greater right than the bankrupt.” Id. Having no greater
rights in the machinery that was conditionally assigned to the “unperfected” seller in that case, the
trustee was unable to recover the property for the benefit of the debtor’s other creditors. Id. at
353.
129

Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412 § 8, 36 Stat. 838,840.

130

45 Cong. Rec. 2271 (1910).

131

See Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at
18 (1973).

132

See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1). Section 544(a)(3) gives the bankruptcy trustee the rights and
powers of “a bona fide purchaser of real property . . . from the debtor, against whom applicable
law permits such transfer to be perfected.” 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). This section differs from
544(a)(1) in several respects, including that it implies in law that the trustee has the rights of a
“bona fide purchaser.” Ordinarily, lien creditors (i.e., the bankruptcy trustee under section
544(a)(1)) are not “bona fide purchasers.” See, e.g., Rev. § 1-201(32) (defining “purchase” so to
exclude “involuntary” conveyances).
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If deterring the creation of secret interests in a debtor’s property was the
purpose of the strong-arm power, one might think that merely technical failures in
notice, which did not meaningfully impair the quality of the notice actually given,
would not expose the transaction to avoidance. That is, to the extent that notice
was actually given, the transaction should be good against the bankruptcy trustee,
since the transaction was no longer “secret.”
That, however, is not the way avoidance law developed. Case law under the
strong-arm power is replete with instances of secured parties losing their security
interests for reasons that appear, in retrospect, to have been nit-picky, at best, and
capricious at worst.133 Initially, it was thought that these injustices could be
attributed to the arcane statutes that governed secured transactions prior to general
enactment of the U.C.C.134 The great formalities that attended pre-code law
created ample opportunities for aggressive trustee’s counsel.135 Yet, it remains
clear that even under the U.C.C., trustee’s counsel has been able to exploit
seemingly innocuous footfaults in the notice given. Mistakes in the debtor’s
name,136 descriptions of collateral137 or the place of filing138 have all been used
against the secured party.

133

See White, Wasteful Litigation supra note [] at [] (collecting cases); Lipson, Information
Technology supra note 120.
134

See Coogan, supra note [], at 319 (“The secured party has had a rough time with the filing
systems of pre-Code chattel security law. Decision after decision, to say nothing of the statutes
themselves, has disregarded the real function of a filing or recording system–namely, to give
notice to other creditors of the actual or possible existence of security interests in property which
appears to be owned by the debtor.”). See generally David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent
Seeking, 79 MINN. L. REV. 817, 834(“It cannot be denied . . that debtor’s counsel and bankruptcy
judges exult in hanging a secured creditor out to dry for the most inconsequential mistakes.”)
135

Some of the older cases are collected by Coogan, supra note [], at 291, note [], and include In re
Urban, 136 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1943) (absence of affidavit); In re International Harvester Co., 9
F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1925) (copy of affidavit not sufficient); In re Leven, 42 F. Supp. 484 (D. Md.
1941) (affiant failed disclose agency status); Sickinger v. Zimel, 6 N.J. 149, 77 A.2d 905 (1951)
(false recital of consideration); In re Holley, 25 F.2d 979 (N.D. Iowa 1928) (failure to disclose title
of subscribing notary); Amberson Inv. Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 266 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1959) (recorded
mortgage failed to recite maturity date of secured note); In re Production Aids Co., 193 F. Supp.
180, 185 (S.D. Iowa 1961) (failure to indicate corporate authority to sign); Nordman v. Rau, 86
Kan. 19, 119 Pac. 351 (1911) Rhode Island Hosp. Nat’l Bank v. Larson, 137 Conn. 541, 79 A.2d
182 (1951) (failure to specify day when monthly payments were due).
136

See, e.g., ITT Commercial Fin. v. Bank of the West, 166 F.3d 295 (1999)(filing against
“Compucentro, USA, Inc.” ineffective where debtor’s name is “Compu-Centro, USA, Inc.”); In re
Tyler, 23 B.R. 806 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (filing against “Tri-Molded Plastics, Inc.” ineffective
where debtor’s name is “Tri-Moulded Plastics, Inc.”).
137

In re K.L. Smith Enters., Ltd., 2 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (laying hens were
“livestock,” not “equipment” or “inventory”); See also In re Northeast Chick Serv., Inc., 43 Bankr.
326 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (chickens were “farm products” not “inventory”).
138

Perhaps the leading candidate here is In re Peregrine Entm’t, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1990), which held that, even though the secured party filed effective UCC-1 financing
statements, its security interest in the debtor’s library of copyrighted films and the proceeds from
those films (royalties) was not perfected because not recorded in the Copyright Office. See
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It is not clear how these uses of the strong-arm power support the
informational goals of notice-filing. If, as may well have been true in many of
these cases, the community of creditors knew or had reason to know that the
debtor’s property was encumbered, it is not clear that a minor error in the debtor’s
name or collateral description created a secret lien, perpetrated a fraud, or
otherwise violated norms of the applicable merchant community. It may be that
the strong-arm power is a necessary evil, exerting in terrorem force over
creditors, compelling them (as the Clow court suggested) to “leave nothing
unperformed, within the compass of their power, to secure third persons from the
consequences of the apparent ownership of the vendor.”139 But simply asking
lenders to do more does not necessarily assure that the community of creditors
will have a meaningful understanding of what the debtor has.
As discussed in the next two sections, the legislative response is not likely to
produce more or better information. Rather, we have seen increasingly
sophisticated attempts to exempt transactions from the obligation to give notice at
all. Sometimes, as with data and intellectual property, the exemptions will be an
inadvertent byproduct of the unusual interactions of new technologies and old
rules. In other cases, however, it is clear that those who draft commercial finance
legislation seek affirmatively to undermine the role of notice-filing.
II. The End of Notice-filing – Three Secret Liens
While the intuitive link between property rights and notice obligations enjoys
both theoretical and historical support, it would appear that commercial finance
law has other ideas. Although revised Article 9 of the U.C.C. continues to require
notice-filing in a broad range of transactions, notice-filing will, as discussed
below, often have little effect in transactions involving increasingly important
collateral, such as data, intellectual property and bank and brokerage accounts.
Moreover, securitization “facilitation” statutes have the potential to render noticefiling entirely optional. This section summarizes how recent legislative
developments tolerate, if not promote, the creation of secret liens.
A. Security Interests in Data and Intellectual Property – Rules on Proceeds
and Continuity of Interest
A shallow reading of Article 9 of the U.C.C. might lead to the conclusion that
secret liens will be a rarity. U.C.C. § 9-310(a) provides that perfection of a
140
security interest presumptively requires the filing of a financing statement.
U.C.C. § 9-310(b)(9), however, contains an important exception for security
interests in “proceeds.” Because revised Article 9 has greatly expanded the
141
definition of proceeds, its rules will often (unwittingly) create secret liens on data
Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 120, at 1071 (lamenting unfairness of apparent
arbitrariness of perfection rules as applied to information technology collateral).
139

Clow v. Woods, 5 Serb. & Rawle, at 282 (Gibson, J.) (emphasis in original).

140

U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Section 9-312(b), a
financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests . . . “).
141

Comment 13 to section 9-102 explains that “[t]he revised definition of ‘proceeds’ expands the

C:\inetpub\ wwwroot\results\4381-text.native.1091721321.doc; 8/5/2004 11:50 AM

The End of Notice

Page 29 of 74

and intellectual property.142
A “proceeds” security interest arises in at least three ways that might create
secret liens. First, revised section 9-102(a)(64)(A) defines proceeds as including,
143
among other things, “whatever is acquired upon the . . . license . . . of collateral.”
This means that licenses of a copyright or patent, for example, should be “proceeds”
144
of the original collateral. Second, revised section 9-102(a)(64)(A) provides that the
145
secured party may pursue proceeds in the hands of parties other than the debtor.
This means that, unless a license is “ordinary course” (non-exclusive), the security
interest continues even as to third party licensees, sub-licensees, and so on.146
Third, revised section 9-102(a)(64)(C) provides that proceeds include “rights
147
arising out of collateral.” This cryptic phrase is not explained in the Official
Comment. It may, however, be quite expansive and pick up all kinds of rights
associated with original collateral, including intangible rights in technologies and data
148
associated with original collateral. I have argued elsewhere that this should mean
that a patent is proceeds of a trade secret, and a derivative work under the Copyright
149
Act is proceeds of a security interest in a copyright. In both cases, the later rights
“arise out of” the earlier rights. This is one reason security interests in data and
intellectual property will arise secretly. It is highly unlikely that a debtor granting a
security interest in one copyright understands that it is, as a matter of law, also
definition beyond that contained in former section 9-306.” § 9-102 cmt. 13 (2001).
142

See generally Lipson, Remote Control supra note 120 (discussing affect of rules on proceeds
and continuity of interest on intellectual property and data).
143

U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(A) (2001).

144

Compare In re Transp. Design and Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. at 640 (declining to treat patent as proceeds of
patent application under former Article 9), with Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 120, at
1135–36 (questioning continued viability of Transportation Design rule in light of revised Article 9).
145

Courts applying former Article 9 had come to this conclusion. See, e.g., Centerre Bank, N.A. v. New
Holland Div. of Sperry Corp., 832 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 27
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 1217 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979); Eastern Idaho Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Idaho Gem,
Inc., 842 P.2d 282 (Idaho 1992); First State Bank v. Clark, 635 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 2001). There was,
however, a split of authority on the issue. See First State Bank, 635 N.W.2d at 30 (discussing split). The
Official Comment now emphasizes the point: “This Article contains no requirement that property ‘be
received’ by the debtor for the property to qualify as proceeds.” U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 13(d) (2001).
146

Article 9 provides that, as a general matter, security interests continue in collateral
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition. U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1). Security interests will
be cut off, however, if such a transaction is in “ordinary course.” U.C.C §§ 9-320 (ordinary course
disposition of goods) & 9-321 (ordinary course license of general intangibles). A license will only
be “ordinary course” if, among other things, it is “non-exclusive” and in the ordinary course of the
licensor’s business. See U.C.C. § 9-321(a). See generally Lipson, Remote Control, supra note
120 (discussing continuity of interest rules).
147
148
149

Id. § 9-102(a)(64)(C) (2001).
See Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 87, at 1132–38.
Id.
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150

granting a security interest in all derivative works it later produces.

The rules on the perfection of security interests in proceeds are complex, but the
basic idea is that the security interest in proceeds will be perfected if the security
151
interest in the original collateral was perfected and any one of three things is true: (i)
the financing statement that was filed to cover the original collateral does (or could)
cover the proceeds, (ii) the proceeds are cash or cash equivalents, or (iii) the security
interest in the proceeds becomes perfected in some other way.152 It will be fairly easy
to satisfy at least one of these requirements, especially when the collateral is data or
intellectual property.153 But satisfying these requirements does not necessarily mean
that anyone is likely to know anything about the proceeds security interest.
Consider an example. Assume that D is an internet retailer of toys. D
finances its inventory with money borrowed from SP. SP takes a security interest
in D’s inventory, which SP perfects by filing a financing statement indicating a
security interest in “inventory.” Assume further, as is often the case, that when D
sells toys in the ordinary course, it collects spending, demographic and similar
information about its customers. Finally, assume that D sells or licenses its list of
customer information to a data aggregator, (B/L).
Presumably, B/L would believe that it was acquiring its interest in this
customer data free of the property claims of others. Even if B/L was highly
diligent, and conducted a lien search, it would only find a financing statement
describing a security interest in “inventory” not “data” (or “general intangibles,”
the UCC label most likely to cover customer data).154 But SP would have a
perfected security interest in this data, because it is proceeds of the debtor’s
inventory, and there is no “good faith purchaser” rule that would apply to cut off
SP’s security interest.155 And, if B/L sold or licensed this list to others – even

150

Of course, to the extent the debtor simply granted a security interest in “general intangibles,” all
copyrights would be covered, whether or not derivative works. Moreover, as discussed in note 168
supra, the instability of the rules on perfecting security interests in intellectual property may provide
some cover for debtors who unwittingly grant security interests in derivative works. The security interest
may attach automatically, by virtue of the proceeds rules, but would have little practical force if not
perfected.
151

U.C.C. § 9-315(c).

152

U.C.C. § 9-315(d).

153

Usually, it will be satisfied by the first alternative because data and intellectual property are
general intangibles in which a security interest could be perfected by the filing of a financing
statement. See U.C.C. §§ 9-310(a) & 9-315(d)(1)(2001).

154

See U.C.C. 9-102(a)(42)(defining general intangibles). See also Lipson, Information
Technologies, supra note 120, at [] (discussing data as general intangibles under UCC).

155

See U.C.C 9-321 (2001). This section provides that a “licensee in ordinary course of business
takes its rights under a nonexclusive license free of a security interest in the general intangible
created by the licensor, even if the security interest is perfected and the licensee knows of its
existence.” A “licensee in ordinary course of business” is defined as “a person that becomes a
licensee of a general intangible in good faith, without knowledge that the license violates the rights
of another person in the general intangible, and in the ordinary course from a person in the
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with D’s permission – the party that acquired the data from B/L (B/L2) would
take the data subject to the same encumbrance. Here, it is virtually inconceivable
that B/L2 would be able to discover SP’s security interest, assuming B/L2 even
thought to look for it. It is not clear how the UCC-1 filed by SP as to D would put
B/L or B/L2 on notice of anything. A clean record as to B/L2 would be false –
SP’s secret lien would survive, and would be enforceable against B/L2.
The full magnitude of this problem is difficult to gauge. In theory, of course,
it should mean that most data in the computers of most businesses is encumbered
in ways (and by parties) not anticipated by the owners (or users) of the data. That
said, should SP actually show up and claim the right to freeze or seize B/L2’s
computer, B/L2 may be able to argue that the data is not “property,” in which case
no security interest would be possible.156 This argument seems a bit recondite
and implausible, since B/L2 probably treats the data as it would treat its other
valuable property. In any case, the jury is out on the question whether data is
property for these purposes.157
A better argument might be one of impossibility. SP may have a security
interest in the data, but, B/L2 would argue, so too would a large number of
unnamed, unidentified secured parties, whose proceeds security interests all arose
in more or less the same way. The data may, in other words, be so fully
encumbered that no one could sort out the real rights in it. An “anti-commons”
would infect the data like a regenerating computer virus.158 Observe, however,
that these arguments, whatever their merits, do not come from Article 9. B/L2
wins only if Article 9 is somehow neutralized.
What if the problem involved intellectual property, rather than data? Assume,
for example, that D developed a data management software program which it
licensed to B/L. Assume further that the security agreement with SP includes
general intangibles, the category that would most likely describe intellectual
property. The software would be subject to the U.S. Copyright Act which would,
for certain purposes, preempt Article 9.159 Until recently, there was some reason
to believe that the Copyright Act preempted all of Article 9’s rules on the
perfection of security interests.160 If so, B/L might have argued that unless the
security interest was actually recorded in the Copyright Office, the security
business of licensing general intangibles of that kind.”
Information Technology, supra note 120.
156

Id. § 9-321(a).

See also Lipson,

See Lipson, Remote Control, supra note 120, at 1350-1356.

157

See Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy Norms
in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. MARY L. REV. 1801, 1840 (2003) (discussing property rights treatment of
data).

158

See Lipson, Remote Control, supra note 120, at 1410-1411 (citing Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 621 (1998)).
159

See Lipson, Information Technology, supra note 120, at 1107.

160

See Lipson, Information Technology, supra note 120, at 1107-1114 (discussing preemptive
force of Copyright Act).
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interest would have been unperfected. If unperfected (because undiscoverable in
the copyright records), then B/L’s rights would have had priority over SP under
most circumstances.
Recent case law suggests that preemption will no longer protect the B/L’s of
the world if the underlying copyright is not registered.161 In In re World Auxiliary
Power, the debtor had granted security interests in certain unregistered copyrights.
The bank filed UCC-1 financing statements as required by the U.C.C., but did not
record the security interest with the United States Copyright Office (the
"Copyright Office"). The debtor’s bankruptcy trustee attempted to sell the
copyrights free of the bank’s security interests, but the bankruptcy court sustained
the banks’ objections, finding that the bank perfected its security interest in
unregistered copyrights by filing and recording its security interest in accordance
with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and
held that federal copyright law does not preempt state law with respect to
perfection and priority of security interests in unregistered copyrights. “There is
no reason to infer from Congress's silence as to unregistered copyrights,” the
court wrote, “an intent to make such copyrights useless as collateral by
preempting state law but not providing any federal priority scheme for
unregistered copyrights. That would amount to a presumption in favor of federal
preemption, but we are required to presume just the opposite”162
Recording copyrights and registering security interests in them would
undoubtedly be a cumbersome, expensive and time-consuming proposition, one
which I have certainly not advocated.163 Nevertheless, it is important to see that
whenever a security interest arises in a copyright, it will automatically arise in a
license of that copyright. World Auxiliary Power makes it easier to perfect the
security interest in both the original copyright and the license. If the license is not
ordinary course, the security interest will continue and the licensee may have no
idea that it is taking its license subject to the prior interest of the licensor’s bank.
As with data, the problem grows as intellectual property is sublicensed and
subdivided, moving further and further away from the parties that initially created
the encumbrance. While sublicensees may take subject to the security interest, it
will (like all secret liens) be difficult to discover ex ante.
The bottom line, then, is that whole categories of increasingly important assets
may be encumbered by secret liens. It should be noted that revised Article 9 is
not entirely responsible for this state of affairs. Even prior iterations, which might
have required notice more of the time, tolerated remote proceeds security
interests, which effectively create secret liens.164 Rather, the problems arise from
161

In re World Auxiliary Power Company, 303 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002).

162

303 F.3d at 1131 (citations omitted).

163

See Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 120.

164

Professor LoPucki catalogued ways that a debtor so inclined could fool creditors by secretly
encumbering property while still complying with the prior (more notice-friendly) version of
Article 9. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on
Building the Electronic Highway, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1992, at 7-9.
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expanding the definition of proceeds to capture property that happens to be
unusually mobile and mutable. Together these developments insure a much larger
universe of secret liens than we would intuitively expect commercial finance law
to tolerate.
B. Control Security Interests
A second source of secret liens will arise by virtue of new rules on the creation of
“control” security interests in bank and brokerage accounts. One of Revised Article
9’s major changes from prior law involves the use of control as a means of creating
and perfecting a security interest. Generally speaking, a secured party will have
control of certain types of collateral –deposit accounts, investment property, electronic
chattel paper or letter-of-credit rights165 – if the secured party has the right to dispose
of the property in question. Because control arises solely by operation of law or
contract, notice filing is either not required or not permitted.166
Although the statute does not make this distinction, there would appear to be two
different kinds of control, bilateral and trilateral. Bilateral control involves two
parties, such as, a bank and a depositor/borrower. U.C.C. § 9-104 automatically gives
the secured party that is also a debtor’s depositary bank a security interest in the
account in question. Because security interests in deposit accounts as original
collateral (not proceeds) may only be perfected by control, the bank need not give
notice of its security interest in the bank account.
Bilateral control has much in common with the right of set-off. Set-off says that a
creditor may apply amounts it owes to a debtor to reduce the debtor’s obligation to the
creditor. The classic examples involved bank accounts held at banks that also made
loans to the borrower. Because a deposit account is simply a debt the bank owes the
depositor, set-off permits the bank to apply the amount credited to the account
(meaning owning to the debtor) against any amounts the debtor owes the creditor
(meaning the loan the debtor is obligated to pay the secured party). Although the
UCC does not generally govern the right of set off, the right has often been
characterized as a kind of equitable security interest.167
165

U.C.C. §§ 9-106, 9-104, 9-105, 9-107 & 9-314(a) (2001).

166

As to deposit accounts, filing was apparently considered and rejected early in the process of
revising Article 9. See Markell, supra note [], at 983 (citing PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE
UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9: REPORT 70
(1992)).
167

See In re Communication Dynamics, Inc., 300 B.R. 220, 223 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (“In
essence, the right of setoff ‘elevates an unsecured claim to secured status, to the extent that the
debtor has a mutual, prepetition claim against the creditor.’”) (quoting University Med. Ctr. v.
Sullivan (In re University Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1079 (3d Cir. 1992)).

Former U.C.C. § 9-104 declared the article to be inapplicable “to any right of setoff.”
However, rights of setoff are expressly recognized currently at U.C.C. §§ 9-306(d)(i), 9-318(1).
Whether a creditor seeking to assert a right of set off must abide by Article 9’s notice-filing rules
is somewhat unclear. In In re Apex Oil Co., the court observed that “[w]hile we agree with Artoc
that a bank or other creditor need not comply with Article 9 and its filing requirements to exercise
its right to setoff, we do believe that Article 9 governs the priority between that right to setoff and
a perfected security interest.” In re Apex Oil Co., 975 F.2d 1365, 1368 (1992); aff’d Apex Oil Co.
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Bilateral control is distinct from trilateral control. Trilateral control occurs where
the secured party is not also the entity that maintains the account. For example, a
secured party has control of a deposit account if the depositary bank enters into an
agreement (known as a control agreement) with the secured party that the
depositary bank will comply with instructions from the secured party as to the
funds in the deposit account, without further consent from the debtor.168 As with
bilateral control, trilateral control arises strictly by contract. Notice-filing is
neither permitted nor effective.
Control is justified as a method of perfection as to deposit accounts, brokerage
accounts, and so forth because there is assumed to be a kind of community
v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd., 265 B.R. 144 (2001). Some opinions holding that Article 9 governs
set-off priority have relied on old UCC § 9-312(5), reasoning that a security interest perfected
before the exercise of the set-off is entitled to priority over the set-off based on the ''first in time,
first in right'' principle which these courts find to be in § 9-312(5). Whether relying on § 9-201 or
§ 9-312, the line of authority which gives priority to the secured creditor over the set-off claimant
has developed to the point where this view has now been described as the ''majority'' approach.
The ''majority'' rule gives the priority to the debtor's secured creditor rather than the bank
attempting to set-off the account, as long as the secured creditor has a perfected interest in the
account as proceeds of collateral.
Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust illustrates the absolute reach of the
proceeds interest under this interpretation. Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank and Trust, 717 P.2d
1341, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 961 (Utah 1986). There, Insley sold backhoes to Schneider on a
secured basis. Its interests extended to proceeds of the backhoes and was perfected by filing.
Schneider sold two of the backhoes to O'Brien for $237,918.00, depositing O'Brien's check into its
overdrawn bank account at Draper Bank. The bank then set-off against the account for the
overdraft owed to it. The court held that old ' 9-201 of the U.C.C. gave Insley the priority claim
over the bank. Any other result, it reasoned, would undermine Article 9's reliance on public filing
and its repeal of policing requirements in the old ' 9-205. The bank was precluded from arguing
that it took free of the security interest as a holder in due course since that argument was not made
in the court below.
However, the Insley court reasoned that even if this argument could be made, it could only
protect the bank in taking the check. Setting off against a deposit credit which was proceeds for
the check would not be protected by the holder in due course rule. The Insley opinion shows that
Courts are attracted to the 'majority' rule, discussed above, because they feel that it is necessary to
maintain the Article 9 scheme of priorities. In sum, an unfiled, unsecured bank should not jump
ahead of a secured creditor with a filing as to inventory, accounts, chattel paper or other assets of
the debtor. Consequently, a bank should file a financing statement when they want to exercise a
right of setoff to maintain priority over other secured parties, but don’t necessarily have to file to
exercise that right. See also Te Salle, Banker's Right to Setoff, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 40 (1981). Other
decisions holding that Article 9 gives a secured party and automatic victory over a setoff include
Credit Alliance Corp. v. National Bank of Georgia N.A., 718 F.Supp. 954, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d 184 (N.D. Ga. 1989); National Acceptance Co. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F. Supp. 1078, 30
U.C.C. Rep. Serve. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1980); Continental Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 251 Ga. 412,
306 S.E.2d 285, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1737 (1983); Southeastern Fin. Corp. v. National Bank of
Detroit, 145 Mich. App. 717, 377 N.W.2d 900, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 603 (1985); In re Calore
Express Co., 199 B.R. 424, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 421 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996); Morris Plan Co.
v. Broadway Nat’l Bank, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Valley Nat’l Bank v.
Cotton Growers Hail Ins., Inc., 747 P.2d 1225, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(a secured creditor had priority over insurer’s set off for unpaid policy premium.)
168

Rev. § 9-104(a).

C:\inetpub\ wwwroot\results\4381-text.native.1091721321.doc; 8/5/2004 11:50 AM

The End of Notice

Page 35 of 74

knowledge about the kinds of property in which a security interest may be
perfected by control. “No other form of notice is necessary” to perfect a security
interest in a deposit account, for example, because “all actual or potential
creditors of the debtor are always on notice that the bank with which the debtor’s
deposit account is maintained may assert a claim against the deposit account.”169
Permitting perfection of a security interest by control therefore represents “a
pragmatic judgment” by the drafters of Revised Article 9 that these security
interests are, in important respects, “public and unambiguous.”170
Where there is “general knowledge” in an industry that certain kinds of
property may be held subject to certain kinds of noncustodial claims (e.g., brokers
always hold securities subject to the claims of other broker-dealers or lending
institutions), it may be appropriate to dispense with public notice-filing.171 The
“community” of banks and brokers knows or assumes that debtors’ deposit and
brokerage accounts are likely to be encumbered, so they could not possibly rely to
their detriment on a “clean” lien search. There is presumed to be no “secret”
because “everyone” knows.
But this begs the question, who is “everyone?” Consider an example.
Assume that debtor (D) purchases an item of equipment with purchase-money
financing from the vendor (V). Under U.C.C. §§ 9-103, V has a purchase-money
security interest in the item of equipment. If V perfects the security interest by
filing an effective financing statement when the debtor receives the equipment, or
within 20 days thereafter, V would have priority over any competing, prior
security interest held by SP.172 V would also believe that it has priority in the
identifiable cash proceeds associated with the equipment.173 Thus, if D sold the
equipment or it was lost or destroyed, V would reasonably suppose that it has a
proceeds security interest in whatever was received upon this disposition or loss,
169

U.C.C. § 9-104, cmt 3.

170

Schroeder, Surrealism, supra note [] at 523-24.

171

Cf. Schroeder Surrealism, supra note [], at 522. Of course, on this logic, no filing or other
public notice should ever be required, since there is “general knowledge” about the kinds of
borrowers that grant security interests in their assets, and what kinds of assets those might be.
Professor Schroeder does acknowledge that a security interest, like any interest in property, must
involve public recognition of the interest. Using a Hegelian analysis, she suggests that property
“involves the publicly recognizable identification of a specific object to a specific legal subject
with some rights to control, and exclude others from, the object.” Schroeder, Surrealism, supra at
527 (citing, among other things, G.W.F. HEGEL. ELEMENTS OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 52-53
& 58 (Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991). Although she appears to support control as
a method of perfection, it is not clear how that method would be “publicly recognizable,” except
among the parties to the contract.
172

U.C.C. § 9-324(a) provides that “a perfected purchase-money security interest in [equipment]
has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same goods, and, except as provided in
Section 9-327, a perfected security interest in its identifiable proceeds also has priority, if the
purchase-money security interest was perfected when the debtor receives possession of the
collateral or within 20 days thereafter.”
173

Id.
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such as the purchase price D received or insurance payable with respect to the
equipment.174
V might also reasonably expect that it has priority in these proceeds. But V is
likely to be wrong. 9-324(a) provides that the purchase-money priority in
proceeds is subject to Section 9-327, which sets forth the rules on the priority of
control security interests. If the cash proceeds from the sale or loss of the
equipment were deposited in a bank account maintained by D, there is no easy
way that V can be sure that the bank that maintains D’s account (B) does not have
a control-perfected security interest in the account. It will be possible to verify
that D has not granted a security interest in the account to B, but it would take
more than a typical lien search.
Not only will the lien itself be secret, but if and when V discovers it, she will
also find that it has priority over her security interest, despite the purchase-money
for which she bargained, and which (so long as the collateral is intact) is assured
by compliance with U.C.C. § 9-103. This is because B would not only have the
security interest in the account, but it would also have priority, even though the
funds in the account may be proceeds of V’s equipment, and even though the
proceeds would otherwise be entitled to purchase-money priority.175 As the
comment to section 9-327 explains, “security interests perfected by control . . .
take priority over those perfected otherwise, e.g., as identifiable cash proceeds . . .
.”176
How would V protect herself from the secret lien permitted by the control
security interest in a deposit account? Presumably, determining the existence and
nature of a control security interest would require consultation with the parties
involved – the debtor, the secured party and (in the case of trilateral control) the
bank or broker that maintains the accounts. It is also to be assumed that the banks
and brokers would not collude with a debtor that fraudulently concealed the grant
of a control security interest. There is, however, no way to assure that a debtor
has not entered into a control agreement. Under U.C.C. § 9-342, a bank that has
entered into a control security agreement is “not required to confirm the existence
of the agreement to another person” unless the bank’s customer (i.e., the debtor)
so requests.177 A similar rule obtains with respect to securities intermediaries (or
issuers) who are parties to control agreements.178 It is not clear how much
comfort one can ever take in a statement that the debtor has not encumbered these

174

U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (defining proceeds).

175

See U.C.C. § 9-322(c) & 9-327(1)(“A security interest held by a secured party having control
of [a] deposit account under Section 9-104 has priority over a conflicting security interest held by
a secured party that does not have control.”).
176

U.C.C. § 9-327, cmt. 3.

177

U.C.C. § 9-342.

178

U.C.C. § 8-106(g).
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assets. These assurances may well turn out to be false, and there would be little or
no recourse for the aggrieved party.179
V could also resort to other contractual protections. She could, for example,
ask the debtor and the insurance company have her named as loss payee with
respect to the equipment. If so, and the casualty check was actually sent to V, her
expectations would be protected.180 Alternatively, V could enter into a
subordination agreement with B, whereby B would agree that V would have
priority in D’s account with respect to any casualty payments arising from
damage to the collateral.181 But there is no guarantee that the other parties will
enter into these agreements. In any event, it is difficult to imagine these
contractual solutions are more efficient than a notice-filing system that would
readily alert V to the existence of B’s security interest and determine its priority
ex ante. While control may bring important benefits to the banks and brokerages
that sought this type of protection in revised Article 9, it is not clear that much
consideration was given to costs associated with the secret liens that these
transactions create.
C. Asset Securitizations
New twists on old secured transactions are not the only potential source of
secret liens in commercial finance law. Recent statutory attempts to “facilitate”
the development of asset securitization potentially dispense with notice-filing
entirely. Under certain of these statutes, if a contract transferring property uses
statutory language, the transfer will be effective even if in secret, and even if other
law required notice of it.
Although several states have enacted such laws, the most important is
Delaware’s “Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act” (“ABSFA”).182 ABSFA
179

Because the bank and broker have no duty to disclose anything, and no relationship with the
other lender/acquiror, it is not clear how liability could be established.

180

Ironically, this would be true even if V did not otherwise have purchase-money priority, since
the possessory security interest in a negotiable instrument will always have priority over any
competing interest in the same instrument. U.C.C. §§ 9-330(d) & 9-331(a) (2001).

181

U.C.C. § 9-339 (2001).

182

73 Del. Laws 214; 2001 Del. ALS 214; 2001 Del. HB 348; codified in Title 6, Chapter 27A, of
the Delaware Code. Other states with facilitation statutes are Alabama, ALA. CODE 1975 § 3510A-2(a)(1) (2002); Louisiana, LA. R.S. 10:9-109(e) (2002); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §
25-9A-102 (2002); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (West 2002); Texas, TX. BUS. & COM.
§ 9.109(e) (2002). The statutes in Alabama, Ohio, and North Carolina are substantially similar to
ABSFA, with all but Ohio’s statute entitled “Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act.” ALA.
CODE 1975 § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9A-102 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1109.75 (West 2002). Texas and Louisiana, by contrast, simply added a new subsection to
Article 9 of the revised UCC that left it up to the parties involved in securitization transactions to
classify the nature of transfers. TX. BUS. & COM. § 9.109(e) (2002); LA. R.S. 10:9-109(e) (2002).
Louisiana’s Article 9, for example, provides:
The application of this chapter to the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or
promissory notes is not to recharacterize that sale as a transaction to secure indebtedness but
to protect purchasers of those assets by providing a notice filing system. For all purposes, in
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essentially contemplates a complete opt out of Article 9 (and, if the statute means
what it says, any other law that may conflict with the securitization contracts).
“Asset securitizations” are generally defined as “the sale of equity or debt
instruments, representing ownership interests in [an], . . . income-producing asset
or pool of assets. . . structured to reduce or reallocate certain risks inherent in
owning or lending against the underlying assets."183
A securitization typically involves at least two parties:
1. The “originator” is the original owner (and creator) of the financial
assets (such as accounts receivable, lease payments, credit card receivables or
mortgage receivables) that are the subject of the securitization transaction. The
originator might, for example, be an equipment leasing company which is owed
lease payments from its lessees. The lessee’s payment obligations are an asset of
the originator.
2. The “special purpose entity” is the initial purchaser of these eligible
assets and is often called an “SPE.” 184
Like a secured transaction, a major component of a securitization is a property
transfer. The goal of a securitization is a “true sale” of financial assets from the
originator to the SPE. If the transfer of these assets is a true sale, then the assets
should be insulated from the originator’s economic troubles.185 If, instead, the
transfer is not a true sale – but is, for example, a transfer for security (i.e., a
disguised financing) – the originator’s bankruptcy estate would retain an interest
in the assets. The assets would then be subject to the many provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code that constrain third parties from acting with respect to property
of the debtor’s estate.
An effective securitization should free the securitization provider (or, more
particularly, those holding the securities issued in the transaction) from
Bankruptcy Code provisions staying acts to obtain possession of, or collect from,
the absence of fraud or intentional misrepresentation, the parties' characterization of a
transaction as a sale of such assets shall be conclusive that the transaction is a sale and is not a
secured transaction and that title, legal and equitable, has passed to the party characterized as
the purchaser of those assets regardless of whether the secured party has any recourse against
the debtor, whether the debtor is entitled to any surplus, or any other term of the parties'
agreement.
Tx. Bus. & Com. § 9.109(e) (2002); La. R.S. 10:9-109(e) (2002).
183

Tamar Frankel, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND
ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 1995). See also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of
Asset Securitization, 1 STANFORD J. L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994); STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ,
STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d. ed. 2002);
SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000).
184

Securitizations may also involve a third entity that purchases the eligible assets
and issues the securities backed by the income stream they produce.

from the SPE

185
Thomas J. Gordon, Securitization of Executory Future Flows as Bankruptcy-Remote True
Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2000) (securitization eliminates risk of regular unsecured
and secured arrangements).
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property of the debtor’s estate,186 permitting the debtor to use cash collateral,187
and to cram-down secured claims in a plan of reorganization.188 Indeed, it is
sometimes claimed that the “efficiency” of securitization derives, in part, from
separating the debtor (and the debtor’s other creditors) from these assets.189
Although estimates of the value of the securitization market vary, it is generally
viewed as involving in excess of two trillion dollars at any given point in time.190
If securitization transactions always involved arms-length, fair-value sales of
payment rights (e.g., receivables), they would likely present few problems.191
However, securitization transactions are often structured in such a way that the
originator retains the risk that there will be a default (or other problem) with the
underlying assets. For example, the originator may be required to repurchase
these assets from the SPE in the event the underlying account obligor defaults.
As and to the extent there is recourse to the originator, the transaction looks less
like a “true sale” and more like a secured financing.192
Although asset securitization is a comparatively recent development in
commercial finance, the true sale problem has been around in one form or another
for many years.193 On the one hand, our law has long permitted a buyer to “put”
defective assets back to a seller on, e.g., a breach of warranty theory without
calling into question the sale character of the transaction.194 On the other hand,
186

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) & (6).

187

11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)

188

11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).

189

See generally Minh Van Ngo, Agency Costs and the Demand and Supply of Secured Debt and
Asset Securitization, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 413, 458 (2002); Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A
Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 1061 (1996); See also Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1996) (discussing benefits of asset securitization where
company keeps valuable assets separate from entities at risk).
190

A recent symposium issue of the Cardozo Law Review suggests that securitization may be
overtaking and displacing secured lending as the dominant form of commercial finance.
Symposium: Threats to Secured Lending and Asset Securitization: The Bankruptcy Code, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. [] (2004).
191

If, in other words, they were not “judgment proofing” devices. See LoPucki, supra note [], at [].

192

Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52
BUS. LAW. 159, 161 (1996); Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 287, 307-08 (1991) (arguing that payment of the full value, not the
existence of recourse, should constitute the border between sales of and security interests in
accounts and chattel paper); Schwarcz, Structured Finance, supra note [], at 621-27; Peter L.
Mancini, Note, Bankruptcy and the U.C.C. as Applied to Securitization: Characterizing a
Mortgage Loan Transfer As a Sale or a Secured Loan, 73 B.U. L. REV. 873, 876-77 (1993).
193

See Pantaleo et al. supra note [], at 164 (“Recharacterization [true sale] cases are centuries old.
They illustrate that the law may not treat a transaction as a sale just because the buyer and seller
labeled it a sale.”)(footnote omitted).
194

In re Grand Union Co., 219 F. 353 (2d Cir. 1914) (seller of accounts agreed that if the accounts
were of poor quality, it would repurchase them or pay buyer so as to guarantee a certain rate of
return for the buyer); Comm. on Bankr. & Corp. Reorganization of the Ass’n of the Bar of the
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transactions in which the “seller” guarantees payment,195 or a particular return on
investment,196 or the “buyer” has full recourse to the seller are generally viewed
as loans, and not sales.197 At the margins it is – and has for many years – been
difficult to distinguish sales from secured loans.198
The recent history of true sale is dotted with cases in which courts were
reluctant, for one reason or another, to recognize the putative sale of payment
obligations. In 1993, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, in Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve,
Inc.),199 held that financial assets sold by the debtor prior to its bankruptcy should,
City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 543-44 (1995)
(describing forms of recourse that may be permissible in structured finance transactions).
195

See Ratto v. Sims (In re Lendvest Mortgage, Inc.), 119 B.R. 199, 200 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990)
(“Where the risk of loss is shifted from the investor to the debtor through a contractual guarantee
of repayment by the debtor, the transaction is a loan and not a sale”).
196

See Ables v. Major Funding Corp. (In re Major Funding Corp.), 82 B.R. 443, 445 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1987); Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters, Inc. (In re S.O.A.W. Enters, Inc.), 32
B.R. 279 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (seller originated mortgages, sold certain interests in them to
buyer, guaranteed the buyer’s recovery on the mortgages and the buyer’s rate of return on its
investment, indicating the transaction was a loan for security and not a sale). See also Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Cos. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 271 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding there
was no true sale where investors with the debtor, who were alleged to own mortgages originated
by the debtor, “were paid interest monthly regardless of whether the original borrower paid [the
debtor]. In the event of default, [the debtor] paid the investor the interest and the principal owing
on the investor’s [original deposit])”; Merchant’s Transfer &Storage Co. v. Rafferty (In re Gotham
Can Co.), 48 F.2d 540, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1931) (“The obligation of [the seller] to repay [the buyer]
all advances [on accounts allegedly sold] in full and to pay certain percentages for the use of the
money, shows that the transactions were essentially collateral loans, and not sales…”); Peter v.
Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52Bus. Law. 159
(1996).
197

Burford-Toothaker Tractor Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 891, 894-96 (5th Cir. 1959)
(transferor assigned customers’ installment contracts to bank, but assignment was with full
recourse, and bank required periodic payments to be made to the bank by the transferor, whether
or not the customers had paid on the installment contracts; court held on these facts that no sale of
the installment contracts occurred).
198

The true sale question was also central to the dispute in Benedict v. Ratner 268 U.S. 353
(1925). There, Justice Brandeis, writing for a unanimous court, held that a sale of future accounts
receivable was really a disguised financing, and therefore a fraudulent conveyance void against the
assignor’s bankruptcy trustee. The purchaser’s failure to exercise “dominion and control” over the
accounts was a fraud on the debtor’s creditors. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 363 (holding that the
assignment was fraudulent “because of dominion reserved. It does not raise a presumption of
fraud. It imputes fraud conclusively because of the reservation of dominion inconsistent with the
effective disposition of title and creation of a lien”). For thoughtful rehabilitations of Benedict,
see Edward J. Janger, Brandeis, Progressivism, and Commercial Law: Rethinking Benedict v.
Ratner, 37 BRAND L. J. 63, 74 (1998)(arguing that Benedict reflected Brandeis’ “’progressive’
passion for financial accountability”) & Schroeder, Surrealism, supra note [], at 527-28 (the
“totally subjective” nature of the assignments prevent creation of a complete property interest in
the accounts).

199

See Gas Sys Octagon., Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve, Inc.), 995 F.2d 948, 957 n.9
(10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting view that sale of asset, if perfected, removes it from transferor's
bankruptcy estate).
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in fact, be included in the debtor's bankruptcy estate. More recently, and more
controversially, the court in LTV Steel extended the reasoning of Octagon, to
conclude that the bankruptcy estate of the originator retained an equitable interest
in financial and assets and inventory “sold” in a securitization.200
Parties to securitization transactions have attempted to address the true sale
problem with fairly elaborate structures, and lawyers’ “true sale” opinion letters,
which ostensibly assuage the bond market and others who invest in securitization
transactions. Such structures and opinion letters are not, however, costless.
Viewing these costs as excessive, the securitization industry has sought to
establish legislative safe harbors.201 The most prominent effort to obtain a
statutory safe harbor involved section 912 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
2001.202 This provision would have amended the Bankruptcy Code to provide that
assets transferred in a qualifying transaction would be deemed not part of the
debtor’s estate. In light of the alleged misuse of SPE’s in the Enron case, section
203
912 was challenged, and eventually pulled from the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
Nevertheless, several states have enacted non-uniform statutes which would
reach the same result, although they take a more circuitous and troubling route.204
Delaware’s ABSFA is perhaps the most aggressive example of this. It declares
legislatively that a true sale will be whatever the parties to the securitization
transaction say it is. ABSFA provides that “notwithstanding any other provision
of law” any property purported, in the transaction documents, to be transferred in
a securitization transaction "shall be deemed to no longer be the property, assets
or rights of the transferor."205 The transfer of property by the originator shall,
under ABSFA, be effective notwithstanding bankruptcy, insolvency or any other
rights that third parties might assert in the transferred assets. “A transferor in the
securitization transaction, its creditors or, in any insolvency proceeding with
respect to the transferor the transferor’s property, the bankruptcy trustee. . . shall
200

In re LTV Steel Company 2001 Bankr. Lexis 131, * 20 (February 5, 2001)(“To suggest that
Debtor lacks some ownership interest in products that it creates with its own labor, as well as the
proceeds to be derived from that labor, is difficult to accept. . . . [T]here seems to be an element of
sophistry to suggest that Debtor does not retain at least an equitable interest” in the cash
collateral.”).

201

See, e.g., letter from Bond Market Association Executive Vice President John R. Vogt to
Senators Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner dated January 30, 2002
http://www.bondmarket.com/regulatory/ABS013002.pdf, at 2.

202

S. 220, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001); H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001).

203

See Lipson, Enron, supra note 13.

204

See Lipson, Enron, supra note 13.

205

6 DEL CODE § 2703A(a)(1). The Delaware Act goes on to clarify that the "transferor in the
securitization transactions, its creditors [and any] bankruptcy trustee … shall have no rights, legal
or equitable, whatsoever to … reclaim … or recharacterize as property of the transferor any
property, assets or rights purported to be transferred… ." §2703A(2); and that in "the event of a
bankruptcy, receivership or other insolvency proceeding with respect to the transferor … such
property, assets and rights shall not be deemed to be part of the transferor’s property, assets, rights
or estate," § 2703A(3).
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have no rights, legal or equitable, to reacquire, reclaim . . . or recharacterize as
property of the transferor any property” transferred in the securitization.206 For
emphasis, ABSFA further provides that if the transferor enters bankruptcy, the
transferor’s “property, assets and rights shall not be deemed to be part of the
transferor’s property, assets, rights or estate.”207
For purposes of the problem of secret liens, the critical language in ABSFA is
“notwithstanding any other provision of law.” This presumably means that none
of the rules in Article 9, or any other state commercial finance statutes, apply if
property is conveyed in a “securitization” (a term pointedly not defined by the
statute). To the extent that Article 9 would otherwise require that a securitization
transaction be made verifiable by the filing of a UCC-1 financing statement,
ABSFA is an exception. ABSFA requires no notice to render a sale effective, and
displaces any competing law.
A quick response may be that, as noted above, Article 9 contemplates a
growing number of transactions in which property transfers can be effective
without notice filing. Security interests in a wide variety of assets – deposit
accounts and investment property – can be perfected by control. A sale of
payment intangibles is perfected automatically, and thus does not require the
filing of a financing statement.208 To the extent such transactions are even secured
transactions, they are perfected automatically, when the security interest
attaches.209 Thus, they would not be publicly verifiable or measurable, even if
governed by the more traditional Article 9 regime.
The problem is that ABSFA applies not only to financial collateral, but to
“any property, assets or rights purported to be transferred, in whole or in part."210
Had it applied to the securitizations in LTV, for example, it would have validated
even the transactions involving inventory, obviously not assets typically sold or
encumbered in commercial finance transactions.211 A similar result might obtain
in Enron.212 Indeed, read literally, ABSFA should authorize intentional
fraudulent transfers, since it trumps any competing state law. ABSFA’s failure to
define a qualifying transaction is equally troubling. ABSFA guarantees true sale
treatment “to the extent set forth in the transaction documents.”213 Thus, a
transfer of property can be effected solely by contract, whether or not the
transaction bears any resemblance to the common securitization. Any secret lien

206

6 DEL CODE § 2703A(a)(2)

207

6 DEL CODE § 2703A(a)(3).

208

U.C.C. § 9-309(2), (3).

209

Id.

210

6 DEL CODE § 2703A(a)(1) (emphasis supplied).

211

Compare Plank, supra note [].

212
213

See Lipson Enron, supra note 13.
6 DEL CODE. § 2703A(a).
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will be effective under Delaware law, so long as “set forth in the transaction
documents.”214
ABSFA would appear to envision a world in which any property transfer is
enforceable, whether or not secret, so long as the transaction documents contain
the magic statutory incantation. Notice-filing under ABSFA would appear to be
entirely optional. Indeed, it may be counterproductive. In order to discover that a
debtor has already sold its assets in a securitization, a potential purchaser or
secured party could never rely on a clean lien search. The possibility that a debtor
may, in secret, have engaged in a qualifying transaction under ABSFA means that
there is simply no way other than contract and diligence – and hope – to know
that one is in fact acquiring clean title to, or priority in, the debtor’s property.
ABSFA contains no exception for fraud or mistake.215
The three classes of secret liens described in this section challenge the basic
intuition that property rights come with corresponding notice obligations. These
liens are, in theory, discoverable, but only at what appears to be a prohibitively
high cost. These liens are inconsistent with a neoclassical vision of property
forms that are (or should be) cheaply and readily identifiable, in themselves. It is
also inconsistent with the historical tendency to use notice to provide information
or control in the absence of more rigorous community structures. It is,
nevertheless, where we are.
III. How Did We Get Here?
Why are we increasingly tolerant of secret liens? In simple terms, because we
have become convinced that notice-filing is economically unsound. The benefits
of notice-filing, we are told, do not justify the costs.
A. The Economic Analysis of Commercial Finance Law
In order to set the table, it might be useful to explain what is meant by
economic analysis, and why it matters to commercial finance law. As virtually
every breathing academic knows, a certain kind of economic analysis of law –
typically associated with the University of Chicago and its eminence grise,
Ronald Coase – has altered the way we approach most categories of private law,
from anti-trust to bankruptcy.216 Commercial finance law – and in particular, the
214

Id.

215

There are, of course, ways that a bankruptcy trustee or disappointed purchaser or secured party
could try to get around ABSFA. They could argue, among other things, that based on choice-oflaw principles, Delaware law did not apply; that the transaction was not a “securitization”
(however defined); or (in the case of bankruptcy) that federal law preempts.

216

See Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1167 (1997) (“The magnitude of the intellectual revolution [of economic analysis] is hard
to recount today because virtually everyone who works in common law subjects is familiar with
the now routine exercise of showing why it is, or has to be, the case that this or that common law
rule is, or is not, efficient.”).

Coase’s landmark contribution to legal thought appears in R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. Econ 1 (1960), reprinted in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW, 95
(Univ. Chicago 1988), an article which has become the "runaway citation champion” among
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law of secured lending – has not been immune from this trend, whose specific
roots are generally located in a 1979 Yale Law Journal article by Professors
Jackson and Kronman which asked a very basic question: Is secured lending
efficient? 217
This seductive problem emanates from the Modigliani-Miller invariance
theory. Economists Modigliani and Miller famously suggested that in a perfect
capital market, the value of a firm could not be traced to the organization of its
capital structure.218 Thus, if a debtor (D) granted a security interest in its assets in
order to obtain financing from a secured party (SP), other firm investors – in
particular, shareholders and unsecured creditors – should charge more, reflecting
the increased risks associated with the security interest. Whatever D might save
in reduced interest costs charged by SP should be at least offset by an increased
rate of interest charged by unsecured creditors. Firm value – and in particular, the
cost of capital to the firm – would not vary by virtue of the use of secured
financing.
The persistence of secured lending puzzled economically-oriented writers
because, although secured transactions were (and are) far from costless to engage
in, they should produce an economic wash internally, and may create greater
social costs through negative externalities. This is because, among other reasons,
many creditors – unsophisticated trade creditors, tort creditors, terminated
employees, taxing authorities, etc – cannot in fact charge higher rates of interest.
Having not “chosen” to extend credit, these “non-adjusting” creditors could not
published law review articles. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited,
71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 759 (1996) (indicating that Coase's article was cited almost twice as
often as the next-most-cited law-related article). Coase had earlier suggested the contours of the
problem of social cost in R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON.
1, 33 (1959)).
217

Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979).

218

Modigliano & Miller, supra note []. Cf. David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured
Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179, 2219 (1994)(economic analysis of secured lending “emanates from
a peculiar misunderstanding of the famous Modigliani-Miller model . . . .”). According to
Carlson, “[t]he Modigliani-Miller model died in 1976, when Michael Jensen and William
Meckling pointed out that Modigliani and Miller assumed that corporate structure never changes
debtor behavior.” Id. (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 332-33
(1976)). Jensen and Meckling identified the problem of agency cost – the cost imposed by the risk
that X will act, wittingly or not, to the disadvantage of Y. Jensen and Meckling, supra. Carlson
writes as if proponents of the economic approach were ignorant of the contribution of Jensen and
Meckling. It is, however, clear that its earliest proponents – Jackson and Kronman – well
understood their contribution, and the more general problem of agency costs. See Jackson &
Kronman, supra note [] at 1149 – 1161.
While the Modigliani-Miller theory may have many flaws, it remains an important tool in
conceptualizing the microeconomics of firm of organization. Professor Schwarcz, for example,
purports to have “solved” the puzzle of secured lending, given certain assumptions, using
Modigliani & Miller. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425, 429 (1997).
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charge correspondingly higher rates of interest (or otherwise protect themselves
219
Thus, while a secured creditor
from loss of recourse to the debtor’s assets).
would have access to all of a debtor’s property, those in the most vulnerable
position would not. This would, in turn, create perverse managerial incentives to
220
disregard risks thus externalized. The debtor that gave full priority in its assets
to a particular secured creditor would have externalized all losses onto those in
221
Since the transaction costs associated
the worst position to protect themselves.
with secured lending were presumed greater than the transaction costs associated
with other methods of financing many academics followed the lead of Jackson
and Kronman in asking why rational market actors would engage in such
transactions. Asking and answer the questions posed by the Modigliani-Miller
puzzle, as writ small in commercial finance law, became an enormously attractive
enterprise for legal academics.222
219

The term “nonadjusting creditors” is generally associated with Bebchuk and Fried, who use it
in Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1996). Bebchuk and Fried take the term one step further,
and apply it to all creditors for whom adjustment may either be costly or implausible, such as
small-dollar trade creditors, or creditors who extended unsecured credit before the debtor granted
the security interest.
220

Bebchuk & Fried supra note [], at 934 (arguing that the rule of full priority “causes excessive
use of security interests, reduces the incentive of firms to take adequate precautions and choose
appropriate investments, and distorts the monitoring arrangements chosen by firms and their
creditors”). Other contributions to this body of literature are collected in Lipson, Remote Control,
supra note 120, at 1403, n. 403.
221

As Bebchuk and Fried explained –
The fact that security interests may be used to transfer value from nonadjusting creditors
under a full-priority rule means that security interests may be used even when they give rise to
inefficiencies. As our analysis will demonstrate, the ability to use security interests to divert
value from nonadjusting creditors tends to distort the borrower's choice of contractual
arrangements with its creditors, giving rise to certain efficiency costs.

Bebchuk & Fried, supra note [], at 965.
There have been a number of responses which develop reasonably plausible claims that secured
lending under certain circumstances can be efficient. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the
Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179, 2219 (1994); Homer Kripke, Law and
Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 929 (1985); Schwarcz, Easy Case, supra note []; Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle
of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067 (1989).
222

See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note [], at 1154 & n.46; Schwartz, Current Theories,
supra note [], at 1052-55; Shupack, Solving the Puzzle, supra note [] A curious feature of the
economic analysis of commercial finance law – the “puzzle literature” – is its obsession with
Modigliani and Miller, to the apparent exclusion of other economic concerns. See William W.
Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 92,124 n.40 ("Oddly, the irrelevance hypothesis has had a stranglehold on commercial-law
theory."). There is, as David Gray Carlson and others have observed, more to the economic story
than simply a price-theory explanation of firm capitalization. Carlson, Efficiency, supra note []
2198, 2211 (summarizing critiques); see also Warner, Antibankruptcy Act, supra note [], at 12
(“although the economic analysis is useful in analyzing questions of allocative efficiency, it does
not provide much insight into questions of distributive efficiency”).

C:\inetpub\ wwwroot\results\4381-text.native.1091721321.doc; 8/5/2004 11:50 AM

The End of Notice

Page 46 of 74

B. Economic Theories of Notice-Filing
Economic analysis of commercial finance transactions expanded beyond this
foundational puzzle, to take on various attributes of these transactions, including
notice filing. Intuitively, we might think that notice-filing is an efficient method
of conveying information about property, especially to those outside of the
debtor’s immediate community. Yet this is not how our thinking has developed.
1. Revenue Theory
The crudest argument against notice-filing involves the upfront, direct costs of
the systems: namely, that these systems are covert sources of revenue for the
government. There are many who view all schemes to require the recordation of
interests in personal property as little more than state confiscation.223 This is
because most such regimes require the payment of a filing fee when the interest is
recorded. Professor Bowers, for example, has characterized the filing system
under Article 9 as “little more than a rip-off”224 because “[t]he market for
information could probably efficaciously do whatever the filing system
bureaucracies do and at a lesser aggregate resource cost.”225 On this view, the
UCC-1 system is simply the worst form of rent-seeking, plagued by incompetent
and indifferent bureaucrats who happen to the brothers-in-law of politicians, or
obligees of political favors.
There is no question that these systems are important sources of revenue for
the states and localities that maintain them, and this has long been true.226 Some
of the earliest recordation statutes were enacted largely (if not wholly) on the
theory that they would feed the public fisc. One of the earlier recording statutes,
the Statute for the Enrollment of Bargains and Sales promulgated under Henry
VIII, requiring the recordation of transfers of title to real property, was allegedly
intended as a revenue statute.227 Professor Mooney has indicated that the same
can be said of the first fraudulent conveyance statute, the Statute of 13 Elizabeth.
This statute provided that transfers with the 'intent [ ] to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors and others' were void, and provided for recovery of the 'whole value of .
223

See Alces, Abolish Filing, supra note [], at 680. See also Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Lloyd,
An Agenda for Reform of the Article 9 Filing System, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 99 (1991)(the UCC-1
system is “the very foundation of the personal property security law in the United States.”)
(footnote omitted); Bowers, supra note [].
224

See Bowers, supra note [], at 724.

225

See Bowers, supra note [], at 725. Bowers argues both that notice-filing itself is little more
than a tax on secured lending (id., at 733 (“The filing system consequently operates as if it were a
tax on secured transactions”)) and that, if any notice system were appropriate, the market would
better provide this information than the government. Id. at 734 (“A properly privatized system,
for example, encourages those who own the system to adopt any advantageous technologies,
without a legislative mandate.”)

226

Paul M. Shupack, On Boundaries and Definitions: A Commentary on Dean Baird, 80 VA. L.
REV. 2273, 2273 n.1 (1994) (indicating that under former Article 9, UCC-1 filing system produced
net gain to states of between $300,000,000 and $400,000,000 annually).
227

See Bowers, supra note [], at 731-32 (citing 27 Hen. VIII, c. 16 (1535)).
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. . goods and chattels' transferred, to be shared by the Crown and aggrieved parties
(such as creditors), and provided for criminal sanctions against the parties to the
transfer.228 The statute was, according to Mooney, “intended in large part as a
revenue measure.”229
To characterize filing as a deal tax is, of course, to stigmatize it. Most
commercial lawyers view taxes suspiciously, regardless of the value one might
ascribe to good government. Yet the proper question is not whether filing
imposes costs– it imposes many – but whether it is worth the price paid. It is easy
to imagine facts in which filing may be economically optimal, or perform other
socially useful functions. It is just as easy to model facts in which filing fails to
satisfy these (or similar) criteria.
In any case, sub rosa taxation cannot be a complete explanation for the rise
and persistence of public notice systems. First, if raising revenue were the only or
most important goal of filing systems, one would expect that legislatures would
never enact the revisions to Article 9 or the securitization facilitation acts, all of
which tend to reduce or eliminate the obligation to file (revenue generating)
notice in commercial finance transactions. Indeed, one of the reasons Article 9 is
viewed as a triumph of efficiency is the fact that it reduced the obligation to file
financing statements in multiple states or on a county-by- county basis (often
required under former law) – which necessarily reduce aggregate revenue to the
state filing authorities.230
Second, and perhaps more important, there are as discussed below, a number
of plausible substantive rationales for requiring public recordation of security
interests. It is difficult to imagine that legislatures are able to enact covert
revenue regimes without any supporting principle. These rationales may have
more and less force, but they suggest that raising revenue alone cannot explain
why public notice is adjunct to certain types of property transfers.
2. Rational Apathy – Charlie Don’t Surf
A second argument against notice-filing focuses on the benefit side of the
equation, and argues that few actually care about notice-filing – especially those
228

13 ELIZ., CH. 5 (1570).

229

See Mooney, Myth, supra note 68, at 726, n 162 (citing 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 61b, 61c, at 89-93 (rev. ed. 1940)).
230

As discussed above, prior law – including earlier iterations of Article 9 -- were generally
viewed as having required more filings in more offices than revised Article 9. This is partly
because former Article 9’s choice of law rules were organized around the physical location of the
debtor, rather than the state in which the debtor was incorporated. Under former Article 9, a
security interest could be perfected by filing in [the debtor’s principal place of business, which
was often a difficult factual determination to make]. The prudent course of action under prior law
was therefore to file everywhere the debtor might have been doing business. Revised §§ 9-301 &
307, by contrast, provide that, for debtors that are “registered organizations” – corporations, LLCs,
etc – the only place to file is the state in which the debtor was formed (e.g., the state of formation
under applicable corporate law) Similarly, former law occasionally required that financing
statements be filed not only at the state level, but also by county. See U.C.C. § 9-401 (2000).
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historically characterized as its principal beneficiaries: unsecured trade creditors.
Except for actual or potential secured creditors – those who formally “rely” on the
debtor’s property -- the general population of creditors is apathetic to the
information provided by the notice-filing system – and rationally so.
Professor White, for example, has argued that the presumed audience for
financing-statement information could, in fact, care less:
Neither the plumber, carpenter, accountant, Commonwealth Edison nor any
other thousands of general creditors check the files to determine who has a
financing statement on file before it decides whether it will extend unsecured
credit in the form of the sale of goods or services. In the words of the trade,
these are "non- reliance creditors" and are not entitled to protection of a lack
of filing because they would not rely on it in any case.231
Baird similarly claims that “the notice-filing system of Article 9 provides virtually
no assistance to unsecured creditors. Parties without ownership interests in the
debtor’s property rarely check the filing system, and if they do, they rarely learn
anything.”232
Lynn LoPucki has offered a slightly more systemic gloss, arguing that
unsecured creditors often do little more than “cash-flow surf.”233 Cash-flow
surfing happens when unsecured creditors make small, short-term extensions of
credit, hoping against hope that the debtor will be able to pay the debt from cash
flow in the ordinary course.234 These creditors may reason that the debtor’s assets
are already fully encumbered, or that they are worth nothing, or that it is simply
not worth making a credit decision based on such complex analyses. Apathy to
the information produced by the system is rational, because learning about what is
out there costs more than it’s worth. The unsecured creditor expects to be repaid
not because it relies on the value of any particular assets, but as the result of “a
combination of nonlegal pressures on the debtor.”235 And the involuntary creditor
231

See White, Wasteful Litigation, at 827. Baird makes a similar claim. See Baird, Ostensible
Ownership, supra note 19, at 66-67 (“the Code’s notice-filing system addresses principally only
one kind of ostensible ownership problem – the one arising from competition between secured
creditors.”).

232

See Baird, Ostensible Ownership, supra note 19, at 55.

233

See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1923 &193839 (1994) [hereinafter, LoPucki, Creditor’s Bargain].
234

Id. at 1924.

235

LoPucki, Creditor’s Bargain, supra note [], at 1941. This is not to say that verification has no
role in the world of cash-flow surfing. LoPucki argues, however, that monitoring will occur not
by virtue of the UCC financing statement system, but instead through informal communications
about the debtor’s financial condition:
[I]f the debtor does not seasonably pay its unsecured creditors, that fact will be transmitted
through credit reporting and other information channels to the debtor's secured creditors,
employees, suppliers, customers and other trading partners. If the reports get bad enough,
others will refuse to deal and the debtor will be unable to remain in business. In this
conception, unsecured debt is likely to be short term and restricted to amounts that are small
in relation to the creditor's portfolio. The unsecured creditor monitors the debtor through
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– the tort claimant or terminated employee – is certainly not going to care much,
ex ante, about what the public record says about nonpossessory interests in the
debtor’s property. Having not chosen to extend credit, involuntary (“nonadjusting”) creditors can hardly be said to have relied on a debtor’s assets.236
Those who assert a general indifference to filed notice are often quick to
distinguish between two hypothetical audiences. While trade and other “simple”
creditors will not consult the record, other more sophisticated creditors – in
particular, secured creditors -- will.237 The claim is thus not that the notice-filing
system should be dismantled entirely, only that it should not be geared to an
audience that does not use it.238 Notice should matter only to “reliance” creditors,
who are presumed to be those who have taken security (or similar) interests in a
debtor’s property.239
Professor Baird has thus argued that “general creditors rely only in part on the
debtor’s assets when extending credit. General creditors base their decision to
lend on the debtor’s general financial health, of which a present or potential
encumbrance of the debtor’s property is only one factor.”240 Moreover, he claims,
“[c]ases in which creditors decide to lend because of their mistaken belief that an
asset is unencumbered are rare.”241 Thus, he concludes, “[t]he needs of general

credit reports and other sources of information and evaluates the risk that the business will be
discontinued. The unsecured credit will be short term because the extender's recourse, in the
event it deems the risk too great, is to withdraw. The unsecured creditor will have the
leverage to withdraw only so long as the debtor continues to value its reputation for payment.
If the business closes, it is usually a foregone conclusion that the unsecured debt will not be
repaid.
Id. at 1941 (footnotes omitted).
236

Nor is this a new claim. Professor Gilmore, a reporter for Article 9, has observed that some of
the drafters suggested that no one – not even lenders – truly relied on the pre-Code notice filing
systems. Rather, the decision to extend credit was based “not on public records, but on financial
statements – balance sheets and profit and loss statements.” Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.1, p.
463. In his view, the “[p]ublic files . . . will be rarely consulted.”
237

See sources cited in note [], supra.

238

See citations at note [] supra.

239

As Douglas Baird argues
[T]he notice-filing system of Article 9 provides virtually no assistance to unsecured
creditors. Parties without ownership interests in the debtor’s property rarely check the filing
system, and if they do, they rarely learn anything. Article 9's filing system principally
serves the interests of secured creditors. ...A notice-filing system... sorts out property claims
among those who have or seek property claims; its function is not to give the world at large
notice of security interests.”

Baird, Ostensible Ownership, supra note [], at 55.
240

Id. at 60.

241

Id. at 60.
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creditors neither justify the costs of the present filing system nor explain its
contours.”242
Arguments against notice-filing based on claims about who does (or does not)
rely on it are curious and troublesome, for at least three reasons. First, these are
often empirical claims about actual behavior, in the real world. As such it would
seem possible to test them. These claims have not, to date, been tested, at least in
any rigorous and public way. Were we, as some have argued, to abolish a system
supported by deep intuition and hundreds of years of practice, we might wish to
know a little bit about who might be affected by the change, and how.
Second, there is reasonably good anecdotal evidence that many beyond
traditional lenders use the system, and for a variety of purposes. In certain
transactions, parties may use these systems as bulletin boards to ward off those
who might try to take an interest in the debtor’s property, even though the filers
themselves have no such interest. Edwin Smith, a leading practitioner, has
indicated that a lender benefiting from a “negative pledge” might file a financing
statement, even though such a transaction would not necessarily result in the
staking of a claim by the lender.243
Paul Shupack has suggested that in certain contexts, trade creditors rely on a
clean record in deciding whether to ship to a debtor who has promised not to
encumber its inventory.244 Trade creditors might, Shupack suggests, “view the
debtor’s use of inventory as security as a public statement of the debtor’s financial
distress, particularly if the debtor had not previously done so.”245 Others have
suggested that equipment lenders would “trawl” the financing statement records,
242

Id. at 62.

243 Smith explains -I have seen this technique used on various occasions for negative pledge agreements and
subordination agreements. In the case of a negative pledge agreement, of course, it is in the
interest of the creditor in whose favor the negative pledge is granted to put other creditors on
notice of the existence of a negative pledge. In the case of a lender filing a subordination, it is
in the interest of the debtor to provide comfort to a new senior creditor extending credit to the
debtor that the senior creditor will in fact be senior. Although neither example fits squarely
into the original purposes of the Article 9 filing system, it seems to me that the commercial
"bulletin board" approach, by providing even additional information about the debtor than that
required by the Article 9 filing system, is useful. And, as the examples indicate, can benefit
either the creditor or the debtor depending on the particular circumstances. See Alces, supra
note [], at 696. (quoting letter from Edwin E. Smith, Bingham, Dana & Gould, to Professor
Peter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary 1-2 (July
31, 1991)).
244

Paul M. Shupack, Preferred Capital Structures and the Question of Filing, 79 MINN. L. REV.
787, 803-807 (1995)

245

Id. at 806. This makes sense only if the trade creditors do not understand purchase-money
priority, or rationally conclude (for any number of reasons) that the mechanics involved in
obtaining that “super” priority are not worth the effort. Shupack suggests that certain trade
creditors may not find purchase money priority attractive because, among other things, “these
sellers have a visceral feeling that the inventory should be ‘theirs’ because they supplied it . . . .”
Id. at 805.
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looking for financing statements that were about to expire. Reasoning that the
loans covered by the financing statements were about to expire, they might then
contact the debtors indicated in those financing statements, in order to “sell”
replacement financing.246 Professor Carlson has argued that the notice-filing
system performed a kind of antitrust function, preventing local lenders from
gaining a strangle-hold on borrowers, to the exclusion of national lenders.247
Third, and perhaps most important from a policy perspective, there are
reasons other than current actual usage for the filing. While some of these include
the communal and behavioral effects of notice-filing, discussed in part IV, infra, it
would seem axiomatic that many public systems perform important but indirect
functions. Even if non-bank creditors do not perform UCC-1 searches, they may
consult credit reporting services like Dun & Bradstreet. These services provide
(or attempt to provide) analyses of companies as to such matters as timeliness of
payment, credit history, and so on. One component of the Dun and Bradstreet
analysis would appear to be an assessment of publicly recorded interests in the
debtor’s property, such as UCC-1 financing statements and judgment liens.248
Thus, even if most unsecured creditors do not directly rely on the public record,
the services upon which they rely for this information may.249 Notice-filing may
246

See email from Howard Ruda, attorney, to author, July 21, 2003 (“There was a time (and
perhaps still is) when UCC (and predecessor) records were searched for marketing information”)
(on file with author).

247

Professor Carlson explains:
By providing information to the national credit market, Article 9 filing improves competition
in the credit market generally. Thieves are deprived of their economic rents, and creditors are
prevented from pocketing the savings. This is an ethically attractive program from many
perspectives, but, once again, it is arbitrary and meaningless to a welfare economist. No a
priori conclusions for welfare economics can be drawn from what has been said. All that can
be said clearly is that Article 9 redistributes wealth from one class to another. These
redistributions will probably affect prices – although this too is an empirical matter – but
merely changing prices cannot be viewed as a priori good or bad.
Again, the rationale for public access to Article 9 filing information is that the system
socialized a useful screening function, thus depriving local creditors of an advantage over
national creditors. But this rationale presumes a context that may no longer be empirically
correct. For example, where it is generally known that assets are always encumbered by
security interests, a filing system may simply cost too much, as many now allege. In these
contexts, filing systems might violate the logic upon which they are founded, in which case
reform is in order.

Carlson, Debt Collection, at 831.
248

https://www.dnb.com/product/ebir_publicfilings.htm

249

The full force of Dun & Bradstreet services as a verification and measurement system were
recently on display in In re Communication Dynamics, Inc., 300 B.R. 220 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
There, the bankruptcy court for the District of Delaware concluded that the review of a Dun &
Bradstreet report was sufficient “notification” of the assignment of a claim to defeat a right of
setoff, as provided in U.C.C. § 9-404(a), which limits an account debtor’s right to setoff against an
account if the debtor has assigned the account, and the account debtor has notice of it. The
account debtor in Communication Dynamics was deemed to have notice of the assignment its
account because credit officer for the account debtor had obtained a Dunn & Bradstreet report
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provide part of the informational foundation on which these systems are built
because all creditors may indirectly rely on it for information about credit
decisions.
3. Redistribution Theory
Perhaps the greatest reason to challenge the view that creditors are apathetic is
that it is disingenuous. That is, the real concern of those who grouse about the
notice-filing system is not that creditors ignore it, but that the penalty for failing
to comply with it is excessive. As discussed above, this penalty derives from the
“strong-arm” power of Bankruptcy Code § 544(a), which provides that the
bankruptcy trustee “shall have . . . the rights and powers of, or may avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor . . . that is voidable by—(1) a creditor that . . .
obtains . . . a judicial lien” on the property in question.250 As noted above, this
power has often been used arbitrarily, in the sense that a lender might lose its lien
even though there was in fact no real information failure. Thus, Professor Bowers
writes, “[t]here is good reason to believe that bankruptcy legislation is intended
mainly to chisel secured creditors out of their bargains.”251 Notice filing has

about the debtor (the account debtor’s creditor) indicating that a secured party had a lien on the
debtor’s accounts receivable:
[Account debtor] T & B argues that it did not receive an authenticated notice because third
party private information providers, such as D & B, are not substitutes for the affirmative acts
of signing or executing required of the assignee/assignor. The Debtor responds that a writing
transmitted directly from a debtor or a secured party to an account debtor is not required to
satisfy the authentication requirement of the statute. . . . Using this analysis, we conclude that
the delivery of the D & B report to T & B, which included a statement that the Lenders had a
lien in all accounts receivable, meets this requirement. Such reports are often relied upon by
parties in determining whether such liens exist. In fact, Mr. Burks testified that T & B does
rely on D & B's comprehensive reports for information about its customers. Therefore, we
conclude that, having received authenticated notice of the Lenders' liens on May 1, 2002, T &
B's right to setoff does not have priority over the Lenders' liens under section 9-404 of the
UCC.
Id. at 224- 225.
I note parenthetically that the Communications Dynamics opinion would appear to have erred
in its interpretation of section 9-404(a)(1). That section provides that the rights of an assignee
(e.g., a secured party) are “subject to . . . (2) any other defense o claim of the account debtor
against the assignor [debtor] which accrues before the account debtor receives a notification of the
assignment authenticated by the assignor or the assignee.” While the Communications Dynamics
court discusses the meaning of the term “authentication” (300 B.R. at 225), it failed to recognize
that a D&B report is not authenticated by the debtor. The mistake may have been in the court’s
assumption that financing statements are signed by debtors. Id. (“we do not go so far as T&B in
concluding that [U.C.C. § 9-404(a)] means actual delivery of a signed copy of the financing
statement . . . .”). Despite this obvious mistake, the court ultimately came to the correct result,
recognizing that the account debtor retained a right of recoupment under U.C.C. § 9-404(a)(1)
regardless of the notice that it did (or did not) have.
250

See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1).

251

Id.
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existed “mostly [as] insurance against bankruptcy”252 or as a “bankruptcy tax” on
secured transactions.253
There is no question that the strong-arm power to redistribute wealth imposes
costs on certain parties. The important question, however, is whether the costs
imposed by the strong-arm power exceed the benefits that might flow from
compliance with the notice-filing rules. I think here the balance sheet becomes
difficult to assess, especially where there has in fact been no secret lien. Where
the community of creditors knows or has reason to know that a debtor’s property
is encumbered, it is difficult to see the efficiencies that would result from ex post
avoidance on purely technical grounds. By definition, cognizant creditors would
have chosen to extend credit informed of the economic risks that the secured party
had priority; it is not clear how society benefits economically if these creditors
were not required to internalize these risks (because a court later avoids the
security interest for technical reasons not apparent or relevant to the parties).
Conversely, where a secured party or other investor has priority in the
debtor’s assets that it is not known, the more formal attributes of the notice-filing
system become important, for the same basic reasons. Voluntary creditors that
extend credit based on significant information asymmetries – who do not know
the data or intellectual property is encumbered, and have no realistic way to find
out – are being forced to transfer value to secured creditors who should have no
rational incentive to make their property interests known. This is because the
holder of the secret lien should want its debtor to acquire as much property as
possible from creditors who would not otherwise choose to lend or sell on credit if
they knew their true economic risks.
In any case, what is clear, and what will be developed in part IV, is that
observations about community, and the role that information plays in
communities, provide important lessons on the role of both notice-filing system
and the strong-arm power, which may help cure distortions in both.
4. Economic Theory – Signaling and Priority
Arguments about the ex post redistribution of a debtor’s property are not
limited to the problem of notice-filing. Rather, questions about balancing the
rights of pre-bankruptcy entitlement holders (e.g., secured creditors) against those
of other claimants (e.g., unsecured creditors) are fundamental to bankruptcy and
commercial finance policy.254 Because, as noted at the outset of this part of the
252

See White, supra note [], at 531. This statement is a bit tendentious, because filing is insurance
only against one form of loss – due to the strong-arm power. But secured creditors lose their
collateral – or its value – all the time. The ordinary course rules expressly contemplate the loss of
rights in collateral by “cutting off” security interests when there has been a complying (e.g.,
“ordinary course”) disposition. UCC §§ 9-320 & 9-321. Similarly, the security interest itself is
worth only as much as the underlying property. While collateral itself may insure against the risk
that the debtor will not have sufficient unencumbered assets to service the debt, there is little
about filing that “insures” the value of the security interest.
253
254

See Bowers, supra note [], at 733.
See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987).
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article, it has been so difficult to develop a satisfactory explanation of the
persistence of secured credit on traditional price theory, a number of economically
oriented writers suggested that the real virtue of secured credit lay in the
informational value of these, as distinct from other, financing transactions.
Varieties of this theory appear in the work of, among others, Thomas Jackson
255
256
257
258
& Anthony Kronman, Frank Buckley, Alan Schwartz, Barry Adler, Saul
259
260
Levmore, and George Triantis. All have suggested that secured credit plays
an important part in solving information asymmetries among a debtor and its
various constituents and, implicitly, that information may play some role in
assessing the efficiency of secured lending.261
As Professor Triantis has
explained “[t]here is little doubt that when a firm secures a larger portion of its
debt than similarly situated firms it communicates information of some sort to the
262
market.”
(a) Signaling
Alan Schwartz initially suggested (but later rejected) the idea that a security
interest would be a kind of “signal.”263 Schwartz reasoned that a security interest
might be such a signal because it would “restrict future borrowing opportunities,
255

Jackson & Kronman, supra note [].

256

Frank H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1393 (1986).

257

See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1981)[hereinafter, Schwartz, Review] (“A firm willing to
encumber its assets is, thus, “signaling” that, in its view, its prospects justify” the costs of secured
credit). See also Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. Legal Stud. 209
(1989)[hereinafter, “Schwartz, Theory”]; Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in
Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1396 (1997).
258

Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 73 (1993).
259

Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J.
49 (1982).

260

George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225 (1992).
261

Information asymmetries arise whenever one party to a transaction possesses superior
information. See also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 698 (1986);
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 595 n.134 (1984) ("The difficulty of assuring oneself of the value of purchased information
has been recognized for some time.").
262

Triantis, supra note [], at 255.

263

Professor Buckley developed a related view that secured lending performs a “screening”
function. See Buckley supra note []. Buckley observed that if a debtor had only unsecured
creditors, lenders would have to examine a debtor carefully to determine its liquidation value in a
bankruptcy. This would be costly because, among other reasons, that would have to know of one
another’s claims. Inserting a secured creditor into the mix, however, would reduce the screening
costs of unsecured creditors, because they would assume that they would recover nothing if the
debtor liquidated. Id. at 1424 (where unsecured creditors assume that they recover nothing in
bankruptcy, the “need not estimate how many other claims will be made on bankruptcy.”).
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give secured creditors greater leverage over firm behavior, and make it more
264
difficult for a firm to reschedule debts in the event of hard times.” A security
interest is an efficient signal to the world that the firms believes that its prospects
265
justify these costs. “The apparent property of a secured debt to communicate
accurately to creditors a firm’s true estimate of its expected earnings indicates that
the existence of secured debt may be explained as a signaling phenomenon.”266
Secured lending may thus be “a way” for debtors to “sort[] themselves out by risk
267
class.”
Schwartz nevertheless had doubts about the signaling explanation. First, he
correctly observed that the strength of the signaling explanation depended on the
knowledge that other creditors have of the risk preferences of the owners and
managers of the debtor.268 But there is no particular reason to imagine that
creditors will know this, or that such information is necessarily cheap and easy to
obtain. Second, the signal may itself be ambiguous as to the quality of firm
projects. If so, these informational ambiguities would infect the equilibrium
obtained from viewing security interests as signals. The signal-to-noise ratio may
not, in general, be great enough to justify the externalities created by secured
269
lending.
(b) Contractual Priority
For purposes of this paper, Schwartz’s principal contribution on the
information costs of secured lending appears in a 1989 article in which he argued
that notice-filing had little value as a means of verifying and measuring property
interests in commercial finance transactions, at least so far as other creditors
might be concerned. This followed from his view of the capital structure that
rational parties would choose ex ante. Schwartz surmised that such parties would,
absent legal intervention, choose highly rigid capital structures, which would
always give the first lender priority in the debtor’s assets (subject to a limited
purchase-money carveout), whether or not the parties characterized the loan as
270
being secured.
Schwartz began his analysis by surveying form books and practitioner guides,
which indicate that lenders often ask borrowers to agree to restrictive covenants
that forbid later borrowing, subject to certain agreed-to exceptions for, e.g.,
264

Id. at 15.

265

Id.

266

Id.

267

Id. at 17

268

Id. at 17-18.

269

Id. at 18 (“If a security-interest signal . . . actually tells creditors little about the riskiness of
firm projects, too much signaling could occur in equilibrium; the total costs that firms incur in
sending signals will exceed the total social gain generated by more appropriate credit
extensions.”).

270

See Schwartz, Theory supra note [], at 213 (“The UCC should give initial financers first
priority, whether or not they are secured, except for a reduced purchase-money priority.”).
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ordinary course trade debt.271 From the existence of these covenants, Schwartz
concluded that the “optimal contract” would give first financers priority over all
272
(or most) later non-ordinary course lenders. That is, the law should recognize
what he called a “true first in time (FT)” rule, “which confers senior rank on the
initial financer who just enters into the loan contract.”273 The problem with such a
system, Schwartz observed, was informational: How would later creditors learn
that the earlier creditor had priority? How, in other words, would later creditors
274
verify and measure other interests affecting the debtor’s property?
Schwartz argued that in a true FT system, later creditors would learn of prior
interests because debtors would want to inform them. Schwartz reasoned that
“sensibly conservative” lenders would assume that all or most debtors are “bad,”
and should therefore pay a high rate of interest.275 Truly “good” debtors – those
that should receive a low rate of interest – would therefore have an incentive to
distinguish themselves. “Good debtors,” Schwartz suggested, “could avoid
paying the high interest rates that uninformed lenders would charge by informing
276
the lenders that they had little or no prior debt.” The “key question,” Schwartz
observed, was whether borrowers could “make credible communications of their
debt status at acceptable cost.”277 He also observed that firms that borrow take the
interest cost deduction. A simple review of any given borrower’s income tax
return would therefore reveal the existence significant prior debt.278 Moreover, to
the extent that a debtor was required to report under federal securities law,
279
material indebtedness would likely be reported. In any case, he argued,
[B]ecause private disclosure seems both cheap and common, there is no good
case for retaining current law on the sole ground that implementing a new
271

Schwartz, Theory, supra note [], at 216-18.

272

Id. at 218-19.

273

Id. at 219.

274

“The question is whether to adopt a true FT rule and thereby permit parties to create secret liens
or to incur the expense of a new filing regime.” Id. at 219 (footnote omitted).

275

Id. at 220.

276

Id. at 220.

277

Id. at 220. He was thus not concerned with demarcating priority clearly, as might happen with
a notice-filing system. “A true FT system probably would date priority from when the initial loan
contract was legally effective. This almost always will be when it is signed.” Id. at 222-223, n.
24. This is a curious claim for a number of reasons. First, loan agreements are typically effective
only for certain purposes at the time they are signed (or otherwise executed) by the parties. The
lender, for example, typically retains the right to decline to fund the loan until a number of
conditions precedent are satisfied. Should priority then date to the time of the closing or
signature? Second, in revolving loans, it is difficult to know from time to time how much is owed
on a given loan. A subsequent lender would have some difficulty in determining how much – if
any – property of a debtor would be available in the event of a default. Indeed, given the first
lender’s permanent priority, a subsequent lender should never arise, because it would always be at
risk of being “primed” by subsequent advances from the first lender.
278

Id. at 220-21.

279

Id. at 221.
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priority scheme would prohibitively increase the necessary costs of notifying
creditors of the existence of prior claims in a borrower’s property. . . . . The
expense to the parties of observing the borrower’s books, which is the primary
marginal cost of a true [first in time] rule, seems cheaper than the costs of a
new public system.”280
It is not clear how a notice-filing regime would work in a system with a true
FT rule. On the one hand, Schwartz seems to believe that a true FT rule could
peacefully coexist with the extant notice-filing regimes.281 While notice-filing
may no longer be necessary vis a vis other creditors, it would, on his view,
282
continue to perform an important function as to buyers of a debtor’s assets.
Indeed, it could even persist as to creditors, although it would not likely have
283
much value. On the other hand, it is not clear why creditors would bother to
take security in a world in which it was always possible (and perhaps probable)
that the debtor had a true FT creditor who would trump the (later) secured party.284
In a world with a true FT rule, secured creditors would be few and far between.
Schwartz recognized that a true FT rule has the potential to create a secret lien
problem. If a true FT creditor always trumps later firm investors, later firm
investors will always run the risk that the debtor has concealed the existence of
such a creditor. Although Schwartz does not speak of the true FT system as if it
created liens, it would nevertheless have the potential to create the functional
equivalent. There would be potential, undisclosed prior interests in a debtor’s
property that would have to verified and measured in order to make a rational
credit (or other investment) decision.
Schwartz argued that a true FT system would not, in fact, create a secret lien
problem because borrowers would, in the aggregate, choose to disclose accurately
and honestly the existence of a true FT lender. First, “borrowers know that to
commit fraud would require them to sustain credible lies against skilled inquirers
280

Id. at 222.

281

Id. at 223 (“The conclusion that a true FT rule is preferable to creating a new filing system does
not imply that the existing filing system should be abolished.”)
282

Id. (“Consequently, the FT rule should apply only to creditor disputes, and the filing system
should be retained to regulate conflicts between financers and later buyers.”).

283

Id. at 223-24 (“A [] reason to retain the filing system is that filing has been considered a
necessary condition to the perfection of security interests. There is no good reason to ban security
interests . . . .”)

284

The practical problems of such a system would be considerable. If a debtor had a true FT
creditor, its effective interest in the debtor’s property would correspond to the amount of credit
extended, which would presumably be an amount that could vary over time, as the creditor made
subsequent advances, as interest and other costs accrued, and as the debtor made principal and
interest payments. If a later creditor sought to take a security interest in an item of equipment it
was selling to the debtor, it could never know for certain that the true FT would not made a
subsequent advance that effectively primed the secured party. Nor is it clear how common
corporate transactions would affect the analysis. If two debtors, each with a true FT lender, sought
to merge, what rule would determine the priority of the lenders? The same problem would obtain
if a debtor sold its assets.
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for a considerable period of time,” he suggested.285 Second, he reasoned that
borrowers want to preserve good will; incorrect disclosures about the existence
(or not) of a true FT lender would harm the debtor’s reputation. Third, if the loan
market were competitive, a separating equilibrium would develop in which the
pooling rate of interest would tend to price in the assumption that borrowers had
prior true FT debt. Truly debt-free borrowers would have an incentive to disclose
credibly their debt-free status, or risk “punishment” in the form of the higher
286
Unless the cost of disclosure were enormous, he reasoned, it
pooling rate.
would be in the interest of borrowers to convey accurately the truth about the
interests that others had in their property.287
Of the prominent economic writers, Schwartz’s analysis has the virtue of
being most forthright about its contempt for notice-filing, and its indifference to
the problem of secret liens. Schwartz’s position suffers, however, from the
optimism that tends to afflict much hard economic analysis of commercial
finance law. There is simply no reason to believe that debtors and creditors
would behave in the ways that he predicts in a true FT system. If nothing else,
recent corporate scandals suggest that very sophisticated people can make serious
mistakes about the real value of complex firms. People can – and apparently will
-- use this complexity to conceal true firm value. It has not been demonstrated
that a true FT system would address and modify such behavior.
Economic analysis of this sort is no longer cutting edge.288 Much of the “low
hanging fruit” promised by the economic study of law has been captured,
devoured, in some cases digested and in other cases regurgitated. Still, it is highly
likely that economic thought has influenced the legislative trend away from
notice-filing.289 A principal goal of revised Article 9 and the securitization
statutes appears to be to reduce transaction costs arising in commercial finance
transactions.290
Yet it would appear that these economic arguments often ignore the difficult
problem of understanding how information about property actually flows in
merchant communities, and whether the rules we have (or are developing) are
likely to produce an optimal mix of information. They may reduce one category
of costs (or costs to certain participants), but may inadvertently create others.
IV. Perfection in a World of Imperfect Information - Community and
Behavioral Observations about Notice Filing
We can see thus far that the trend in commercial finance law ignores the
intuitive link between property, information and community – the idea that
285

Id. at 224.

286

Id. at 224.

287

Id. at 224-25.

288

See Epstein, supra note [].

289

For example, Professor Mooney – one of the reporters for Revised Article 9 – has been known
to engage in economically-oriented analyses. See generally Mooney, supra note 68.

290

See note [CROSS X EFFICIENCY CITES], supra.
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property rights come with notice obligations – and increasingly tolerates secret
liens. For the most part, these developments have been rooted in economic
thinking about commercial finance law and the role that notice-filing might play
in it. The aggregate costs of notice-filing exceed its benefits.
This section suggests that there are other ways to understand the role of
notice-filing. These other understandings – rooted in the ways that information
functions in commercial communities, and the behavioral consequences of noticefiling -- might better explain the proper role of notice-filing – and why it should
not be abandoned or diminished lightly.
A. Community Norms
It is easy to forget that notice-filing systems were an outgrowth of systems
intended in part to shape communities. As discussed in Part I.B., the title registry
systems used in Massachusetts before the Revolution existed both to deal with
fraudulent conveyances and to regulate the admission of new members to the
291
community. Notice-filing can be seen in part as a response to the community
transgression that separates property from information about it. But community
also implies a set of understandings about the development and distribution of
information. Those within a community, the idea seems to be, will have access to
and the means of interpreting certain kinds of information. Those who are not
members of the community will not.
We know something about how at least some contemporary communities deal
with information about the property rights of their members. The work of writers
such as Robert Ellickson292 and Lisa Bernstein293 suggest that community
structures can often be a proxy for more formal information-generating rules
which might govern notice-filing.
Consider Ellickson’s study of ranchers in Shasta County, California.
Ellickson studied what may be the seminal form of verification and measurement
problem: Boundary disputes among adjacent landowners, specifically the
ranchers and farmers that Coase posited in his landmark 1961 article, The
Problem of Social Cost.294 In attempting to find out how a particular group of
291

See discussion at notes []-[], supra.

292

Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 52-53, 72-76
(1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1320- 21 (1993). Although
Ellickson has made an enormously valuable contribution, he was not the first to study property
rights in small communities. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967) (Papers & Proc.) (family property in beaver-hunting territories
among the Montagnes in eastern Canada with the advent of the fur trade).
293

See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant
Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765
(1996); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). Bernstein’s work grows
out of a rich tradition of empirical legal analysis which emanated generally from Yale Law
School, and found its most important early expression in Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
294

See Coase, supra note [].
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individuals addressed the problem of social cost, Ellickson found that neither
traditional doctrine nor received economic wisdom would predict behavior
accurately. Ellickson studied the ranchers and farmers of Shasta County
295
California in the early 1980s. As the title of the book suggests, Ellickson found
that members of this fairly close-knit community often declined to resort to
formal legal action when boundary disputes arose amongst members of the
community.
But that is not to say that formal law had no role in resolving disputes in
Shasta County. Ellickson observes that when the cattle wandered off the fields,
and onto the highway, California tort law – and not the communal norms of
cooperation – would likely resolve any dispute that arose between the owner of
the cow and the driver of the car that might have occupied the same point in space
and time.296 While the ranchers may not have fully understood the nature of their
liability – they believed, despite repeated losses, that “’the motorist buys the cow
in open range’”297 – the rest of world did. And this liability was determined not
the norms of the Shasta county community, but by California law on negligence,
animals and insurance.
Based on this, among other things, Ellickson developed an intuitively
appealing hypothesis: “members of a close-knit group develop and maintain
norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members
298
obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.” In simpler terms, Ellickson
observed, this meant that “members of tight social groups will informally
299
But, the corollary
encourage each other to engage in cooperative behavior.”
would have to be that informality or norms-governed rule-making would be
inappropriate when these conditions – principally the social cohesion condition –
did not obtain. Among other things, he recognized that normatively influenced
systems of control might tend to externalize costs to those outside the community.
“[N]orms that add to the welfare of the members of a certain group commonly
impoverish, to a greater extent, outsiders to that group,” he observed, citing,
among other things, the treatment of African Americans in the presence of norms
of racial discrimination.300
Ellickson did not discuss the financing of cattle in Shasta county, so it is not
clear whether a more insular, norms-based system applied to the resolution of
debtor-creditor disputes, or the more formal legal rules were assumed to apply.
The suggestion seems to be that within the community, the norms-based regimen
295

Ellickson, Order, supra note [].

296

Id. at 82.

297

Id. 103

298

Id. at 167 (emphasis in original).

299

Id. Ellickson recognized that this position resonated with works of writers as divers as
Alexander Bickel, Lon Fuller, Frederick Hayek, Thomas Schelling, “and similar scholars who in
diverse ways have kept alive Burkean notion that decentralized social forces contribute
importantly to social order.” Id. (citations omitted).

300

Id. at 169.
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would apply. Thus, he observed “When a notorious informal debt has been
repaid, the party who has been made whole bears an informal duty to tell others
301
that accounts have been squared.” But outside the community, the suggestion
seems to be that more traditional, baseline rules of law do and should apply. The
informal methods of rule generation and enforcement within the community do
not necessarily obtain outside the community.302 It would be difficult, for
example, to imagine that agricultural lenders would rely solely on reputation,
gossip, and informal social control to enforce their loans, or to make a decision to
extend credit. Within the group, informal measures may be adequate proxies for
obtaining information about a debtor’s property. It is hard to see that the same
would be the case outside the group.
Lisa Bernstein’s study of diamond merchants yields a similar suggestion.
Bernstein sought to understand why diamond merchants, especially those in the
New York Diamond Dealers Club, rarely resorted to established legal
mechanisms to create contracts or to resolve disputes over them.303 Unlike
Ellickson, Bernstein does discuss the role that credit and financing play in the
304
Credit was an important component of sales among diamond
diamond trade.
merchants, where “bargaining over the term of payment became an important and
contentious stage in contract negotiations.”305 According to Bernstein, payment
terms (other than cash on delivery) were often 30- or 60- days. These periods
often corresponded to the time involved in finishing the stone, so Bernstein
surmised that “sellers generally finance most, if not all, of the buyer’s
(manufacturer’s)) cash gap.”306
Bernstein discusses the mechanics of external financing only indirectly. She
observes that a fairly small number of banks were involved in the diamond
industry, because valuing diamonds was often beyond the expertise of most
bankers.307 While diamonds may be valuable property, it would appear that the
value of this property plays only an incidental role when banks decide to extend
credit to insiders in the diamond industry. Rather than collateral value, per se,
lenders in Bernstein’s study were more concerned with merchant reputation.308
301

Id. at 232.

302

Id. at 283 (“As prior investigators have found in other contexts, disputants are increasingly
likely to turn to legal rules when the social distance between them increases . . . .”).

303

Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra note [], at 116 (“the diamond industry is unique in its
ability to create and, more important, to enforce its own system of private law.”)

304

She characterizes diamond markets as both a commodities market and an “implicit capital
market.” Id.. at 131

305

Id. at 131

306

Id. at 131.

307

Id. at 154, n. 67. She notes that at that time Merchants Bank of New York was attempting to
develop an in-house group of gem experts with access to important intraindustry reputation
information. Id at 132, n. 38.

308

Id. at 154, n. 67 (quoting banker as observing “in terms of extending credit a bank has to look
at the three C’s – Capital, Culpability and Character. At our bank, we think that character is the
most important C.”)
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“[A]lthough defaulting on a loan would hurt any businessman’s credit rating,”
Bernstein observes, “the damage to a diamond dealer is more severe since there
are only a few industry lenders and banks must rely to greater extent on dealers’
309
reputation in valuing assets.”
One might infer from this that information-generating rules on such things as
notice-filing did not matter. But it would appear that notice-filing does play a part
in the financing of diamond transactions, especially vis a vis those outside the
“community,” such as banks. Bernstein observed that many transactions within
the industry took the form of consignments – sales where the seller retains title
under the buyer resells or returns the goods in question. As under current law, the
UCC in the early 1990s provided that a consignor would protect its interest in
consigned goods if it filed an effective UCC-1 financing statement adequately
310
If the consignor failed to file an effective financing
describing the goods.
statement, however, it would lose its rights in the goods as against a competing
bankruptcy trustee (under the strong-arm power) or a bank with a perfected
security interest in the buyer’s inventory.311
As an historical matter, Bernstein found that consignment agreements were
always concluded orally. However, Bernstein observed, this began to change as
dealers discovered that they would lose their interest in the consigned goods if the
buyer got into financial trouble. Thus, the legal counsel to the DDC advised
dealers that the UCC “will give you protection it you adequately describe your
diamonds and file a UCC-1 Financing Statement . . . . this will give you a legal
leg to stand on if you unfortunately have to seek the return of your merchandise
from a bank or a trustee in bankruptcy.”312 Thus, consignment agreements – and
in larger transactions UCC-1 financing statements – became part of the diamond
industry.313
Bernstein suggested that the formal consignment agreement served two
important functions, one internal, the other external. Internally, the consignment
agreement would function like a bill of sale, providing evidence of what the
transaction was supposed to have been in the event of a later dispute.314
Externally, the formal consignment agreements were critical to demonstrating the
intentions of the parties to a court. “Without them,” Bernstein noted “courts tend
to interpret the meaning of an intraindustry consignment agreement in ways that
309

Id. at 154-55, n. 67.

310

U.C.C. § 2-326 (2000) (discussing rights of consignment seller); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (2001)
(defining consignment) & 9-319 (2001) (discussing rights of consignment seller).
311

This is another example of the “strong arm” power, discussed in part [], above. A recent
example of this appears in In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105,212-125 (Bankr. D. Del.
2003)(“unperfected” consignment sellers lose priority to bankruptcy trustee).
312

Id. at 155, n. 69 (quoting S. Herman Klarsfeld, Legal Gems N.Y. Diamonds, May 1988, at 63).

313

Id. at 155 (“when a dealer gives goods on consignment, a formal consignment memorandum
that satisfies the requirements of the [UCC] is now sometimes drawn up to ensure that the
[consignment seller’s] title to the goods will be recognized by the legal system.”)(footnote
omitted).
314

Id. at 155.
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are strongly at odds with industry custom and the intent of the original contracting
315
parties.”
Like the ranchers of Shasta County who collide with outsiders, Bernstein’s
study suggests that informal, community-based methods of setting rules and
remedies may be appropriate within a group, but not necessarily outside of it.
Community can be a proxy for more formal methods of gathering and
disseminating information, such as notice-filing systems. Notice-filing may not
matter to diamond merchants inter se, since they know (or believe they know) all
that is important to know about one another in order to trade internally. But the
possibility that their transactions will have to be explained to an outsider judge or
bank suggests that more formal informational mechanisms are still important. Put
another way, while the community of diamond-merchants may elect to adopt or
reject certain commercial conventions inter se, there seems to be no doubt that
more formal rules will govern the interface between those within the community
and those outside of it. Notice-filing may be an informational bridge to the
outside world.
The work of Ellickson and Bernstein has two important lessons for the role of
notice-filing. First, where information about property and other credit-related
matters (e.g., reputation for trustworthiness) is readily available to all members of
the relevant community, it is not clear that more formal notice-filing systems are
necessarily useful. If all creditors of a debtor know that the debtor’s assets are
fully encumbered by a first-priority security interest, is there any legitimate basis
for avoiding the security interest if the financing statement perfecting the interest
is somehow technically deficient? If there is no secret lien in fact, who benefits
from avoiding the security interest?
Second, and perhaps more important, where there is no information-rich
community, in which the existence and extent of property (and other) interests are
reasonably well understood, the more formal methods of generating and
disseminating information about property – e.g., notice filing – become
increasingly important. Thus, in simpler times, when communities were more
closely knit, cruder signals about property were or should have been acceptable.
316
On this view, the nonpossessory security interest in Clow and the factor’s lien in
317
Ryttenberg should have survived challenge. Neither case suggests that anyone –
within or without the community – lacked knowledge of the security interests in
question.
But as things become more complex, community structures may break down.
Thus, the downstream buyer or licensee of data or intellectual property should not
have to worry about the security interest of a lender several generations prior in
the chain of interest, which is not known to the buyer’s general community and
315

Id. at 156.

316

Recall that Clow avoided an unrecorded, nonpossessory security interest. See discussion of
Clow, supra notes [] – [].

317

Recall that Ryttenberg avoided a factor’s lien despite the posting of a sign at the debtor’s
warehouse. See discussion of Ryttenberg, supra notes []-[].
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which would not be discoverable by even a reasonably diligent search. Similarly,
it is not clear how to address the rights and expectations of those who may come
into conflict with a control-perfected security interest. The equipment vendors of
the world may be sophisticated enough to understand that their borrower’s banks
have a right of setoff, which is akin to the bilateral form of control discussed in
part II.B., above. But would they necessarily understand that they can lose the
casualty value of their collateral to an undisclosed third party (e.g., in a trilateral
control agreement)? Should they not at least have the option to know ex ante the
risk they are taking?
A similar analysis might inform our thinking about the role of notice-filing in
asset securitization. Where a transaction is well-publicized – and generally
understood by the debtor’s community of creditors – it is not clear that noticefiling adds much. But the complexity of these transactions suggests that even if
318
they are public, they may not be well understood. While notice-filing will not
necessarily explain much about the intricacies of the transaction – it will say very
little about it – it provides some basic information to those outside the
community, who may be the parties with the least information about, and poorest
understanding of, the deal. It will at minimum create the possibility that they will
inquire further.
B. Behavioral Implications of Notice-Filing
If community is proxy for notice-filing, what should inform our rules about
information generation in the absence of community? To date, the analysis has
been dominated by the economic discussions set forth in part III above. While
these analyses have produced both heat and light, they also have significant
limitations. Perhaps the most important shortfall stems from their assumptions
about human behavior. Economic analysis in general has been dominated by
rational choice theory, the view that human beings are logical maximizers of selfinterest.319 Rational choice theory describes “how people would behave if they
followed the dictates of a series of logical axioms, [and] posits that people make
outcome maximizing decisions.”320
318

See, e.g., Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note [].

319

See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 433, 436 (“The single most important contribution that law and economics has made to the
law is the use of a coherent theory of human decision-making (‘rational choice theory’) to
examine how people are likely to respond to legal rules.”).
320

Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference an the Law, 97 NW. L.. REV. 1115, 1116
(2003) (citing Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioural Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060 –66 (2000)).
Herbert Simon describes the "economic man" who is perfectly rational as follows:
This man is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if
not absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He is assumed also to
have a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and a skill in computation that
enables him to calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which
of these will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale.
Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99 (1955).
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Perhaps the most important incursion into the rational choice fortress has
come from the field of behavioral economics, sometimes called cognitive theory.
321
Emanating from the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, behavioral
322
economists – and the many legal academics who trail in their wake – have
demonstrated that human beings often make significant mistakes in judgment and
analysis which would be inconsistent with the rational actor model. While we
may attempt to be rational, we often engage in what Mark Seidenfeld has aptly
called “cognitive loafing”323 – we find mental shortcuts (“heuristics”) that help us
make decisions. These heuristics, however, often lead to results that are
demonstrably at odds with what rational self-maximizers would choose. In
particular, these cognitive errors “plague many financial decisions,”324 including
those involving extensions of credit.
1. Cognitive Errors
Cognitive theory literature has thus made a significant contribution to our
understandings of borrowing behavior. Professor Rachlinski recently catalogued
three related cognitive biases that might lead to overinvestment in the form of
taking on too much debt: (i) the “availability” heuristic, (ii) anchoring and (iii)
325
The availability heuristic holds that we will more likely
overconfidence.
remember instances of overcoming hardship to pay debts than the failure to do
so.326 Anchoring means that a borrower would root her decision to borrow today
in her past ability to satisfy obligations.327 Overconfidence means that borrowers
321

CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES, AT IX-X (DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY EDS. 2000);
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames,
39 AM. PSYCH. 341 , 342-44 (1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of
Preferences, 246 SCI. AM. (1982); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect
Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 298 (1982);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 SCI. 453 (1981); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Rational choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S257-60 (1986).
322

See generally Symposium: Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of
Law and Human Behavior, 97 NW. U L. REV. 1075 (2003); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
(Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Cass Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress
Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115 (1999); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The’New’ Law and Psychology:
A Reply to Critics, Skeptics and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000); Gregory
Mitchell, Taking Behaviorism Too Seriously?
The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1715 (2002).
323

Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002).

324

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Case for Paternalism,, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1165, 1182
(2003) (citing Donald Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851 (1992))

325

Rachlinski, supra note [], at 1183.

326

Id. at 1183 (citations omitted).

327

Id. (citations omitted).

C:\inetpub\ wwwroot\results\4381-text.native.1091721321.doc; 8/5/2004 11:50 AM

The End of Notice

Page 66 of 74

may tend to overstate their ability to foresee unfavorable economic circumstances
328
Together, these biases create “vulnerability to
which might lead to default.
excess indebtedness” that might influence how we develop rules governing the
329
rights and remedies of debtors and creditors.
The problem of cognitive error has been studied in the context of securities
law,330 commercial law (e.g., sales),331 and contract law.332 However, there has to
date been no attempt to understand what these phenomena might imply for noticefiling in commercial finance transactions. What might the behavioral effects of
notice-filing be?
First, the financing statement might counter the irrational optimism that comes
from the collective force of the availability, anchoring and overconfidence biases.
As the warning that alerts a creditor to further investigate various competing
claims to a debtor’s property, the financing statement might slow the otherwise
exuberant creditor from making a precipitous decision. It might inject a level of
caution and deliberation, forcing the creditor to consider more carefully the full
ramifications of the credit decision.
This will more likely be true if creditors as a whole have confidence in the
notice-filing system. If creditors believe that the system gives them information
about the debtor that materially aids a decision to extend credit, the system itself
will develop a self-reinforcing authority. Creditors will be able to use the
328

Id. (citations omitted).

329

Id.

330

See, e.g., William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented
Contextual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311 (1984); Marcel Kahan,
Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992)
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 OR. L.
REV. 301, 315 (2000) Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002); Donald C.
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 851, 859-62 (1992); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some
Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84
CAL. L. REV. 627, 634-41 (1996); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A
Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133 (2000).
331

See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential Damages: Default
Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339 (1998); Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance
of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71 (1998); Russell
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 UNIV. CHI.
L. REV. 1203 (2003); Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of
Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1688 (1998).
332

Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV.
211, 213-14 (1995); Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the
Bargain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1142-49 (1986) (showing that contracting parties rely
on the "representativeness" and "availability" heuristics, which lead them to overestimate the
likelihood that the terms of the contract will be performed); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of
Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and
Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that cognitive errors in consumers justify
imposing mandatory terms in health insurance contracts)
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presence – or absence -- of a filed financing statement as a kind of heuristic for
assessing the debtor’s credit worthiness.
If, by contrast, the system is viewed as unreliable, creditors may be expected
to react with excessive caution. If creditors or purchasers or others who care
about the debtor’s property have reason to believe that undisclosed interests in
that property may be asserted against them, they will likely discount the value of
that property, and the value of the debtor as a potential trading partner. Whether a
333
rational response to a lemons problem, or a biased response that impedes selfinterest, the lack of confidence in the system should, over time, affect the
informational value of the system. If no one believes it is accurate, no one would
rely on it.
2. The Reflexive Function of Notice-Filing
Another behavioral implication of the notice-filing system would look not at
the effect that giving notice has on the presumed audience for the information
(creditors and other investors), but instead how notice-filing obligations channel
and possibly improve the behavior of those obligated to file. This has been an
especially important and controversial topic in the securities law context, where
disclosure per se – while voluminous – has not necessarily produced more
intelligent decision-making.334 There is nevertheless a view that forcing corporate
actors to divulge information about the firm and themselves will affect their
behavior with respect to the firm and third parties.335 This claim has, for example,
been made where there are social or environmental consequences to corporate
action that might be affected or altered by disclosure.336 This “reflexive”337
function of disclosure focuses on the ways that behavior may be shaped by forced
disclosure. Reflexive theories of disclosure capitalize on the idea that if we are
333

George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 500 (“the difficulty of distinguishing good quality from bad is inherent in the
business world.”).
334

Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 419 (2003) (“the provocative implication of
information overload is that the federal mandatory disclosure system might be more effective if it
were scaled back-- that is to say, if less were disclosed, not more.”); Schwarcz, Complexity, supra
note [].
335

See David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social
Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41 (1999); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
336

See generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995)
(discussing environmental disclosure from a "reflexive law" viewpoint); Perry E. Wallace,
Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities Under the Securities Laws: The Potential of SecuritiesMarket-Based Incentives for Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093 (1993) (analyzing
environmental disclosure from a market-based efficiency perspective);
337

Reflexive law “attempts to influence decision-making and communication processes with
required procedures.” Hess, supra note [], at 51 (citing ERIC BREGMAN & ARTHUR JACOBSON,
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: SELF-REGULATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, IN THE
CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION 211 (Gunther Teubner et al. eds.,
1994)).
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forced to tell the world what we are doing, we may reflect more carefully on our
338
than actions than would otherwise be the case.
How might this play out when applied to the UCC-1 financing statement? A
debtor and secured party (or securitization financer) who have no obligation to
inform the world that one of them (the debtor) is conveying some property to the
other will likely treat that property differently than if disclosure, no matter how
discursive, were required. The property may, actually or metaphorically, be held
out as an inducement to third parties of one sort or another (akin to reliance
considered so distressing by the court in Clow v. Woods, discussed at the outset of
this article). The debtor and the secured creditor may tolerate dissipation of the
property, or carelessness with its maintenance. If, however, the relationship has
been disclosed, behavior might change.
3. Binary v. Fuzzy Disclosure Rules
The reflexive function of disclosure is, Professor Malloy recently observed,
339
likely more powerful when disclosure rules are “fuzzy” rather than “binary.” A
binary disclosure system is one in which compliance is “a black or white state of
affairs.”340 Either disclosure has been given according to the prescribed rules or it
has not. Fuzzy disclosure, by contrast, establishes “a gray relationship between
an indeterminate standard and an uncertain factual situation.”341 Malloy has
argued that in the presence of ambiguity, binary disclosure rules tend to undercut
the reflexive effects that disclosure might otherwise produce, creating
opportunities for strategic noncompliance. “Binary disclosure provisions simply
task [a] manager with answering the same question all over again.”342 Fuzzy
disclosure rules, by contrast, “challenge[] the individual to think more closely
about the position taken than would be the case absent the disclosure
obligation.”343
The U.C.C. notice-filing system as it has developed to can certainly be seen as
a binary system. As discussed in part I.B, above, the slightest technical errors in
the giving of notice have often been used to avoid security interests entirely.
Where notice has been required, especially under prior law, the notice was either
effective or it was not. The survival of the security interest was a black and white
matter that did not turn in any meaningful sense on the actual knowledge of those
338

This whole approach to securities laws is nascent, and is the subject of some controversy. See
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81
WASH. U. L. Q. ___, ___ (2004); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, And The
Paradox Of Compliance, 52 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1343, 1407-10 (1999)(disclosure regimes may
create false image of “corporate social responsibility”); RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME
AND SENTENCING 867-883 (1994).
339

Timothy Malloy, Disclosure Stories, __ Fl. St. L. Rev. __ (2004) (Mar. 22, 2004 draft at
23).

340

Id.

341

Id. (citing BART KOSKO, NEURAL NETWORKS AND FUZZY SYSTEMS 3, 33
MICHAEL SMITHSON, IGNORANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 108-18 (1988)).
342

Id. at 46.

343

Id. at 53
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transacting with the debtor. This has not surprisingly led those who craft
disclosure rules – the drafters of revised Article 9 and the securitization
facilitation statutes, for example – to formulate rules that are as easy as possible to
comply with. The easiest disclosure rule to comply with, of course, is none at all,
which is where our commercial finance law seems to be headed.
A fuzzier tolerance for the real distribution of information in any given
situation might encourage more reflexive behavior on the part of those required to
file these notices (i.e., the debtor and secured party). In particular, Professor
Malloy has argued, fuzzy disclosure rules may lead to greater individual
accountability. This may cause greater cognitive dissonance for those responsible
for the filing, but may also lead them to consider more carefully the full effects of
the course of action. This is, Malloy observes, especially important when
disclosure might involve multiple audiences with potentially conflicting responses
344
Fuzzy disclosure rules would, at least
to the information in question.
potentially, require individuals to “engage in [a] more sophisticated evaluation of
the alternative positions than under a binary disclosure scenario.”345
Fuzzier disclosure rules might therefore reduce the incidents of arbitrary
avoidance, while still channeling and perhaps improving the behavior of those
primarily responsible for generating and filing notice. If secured parties, in
particular, were more concerned about who actually knew of their interest in the
debtor’s property, and less concerned with satisfying the binary rules of noticefiling that have developed to date, they might be less inclined to engage in
strategic but meaningless compliance. If, for example, a secured party could
pursue data or intellectual property in the hands of remote parties only when the
remote party actually knew (or had reason to know) of the proceeds security
interest, the secured party would take steps to assure that that remote party had
knowledge. If a security interest in a bank account would be enforceable only if
other creditors of the debtor had some actual or constructive knowledge of the
bank’s interest in it, the secured party and debtor will take meaningful action to
assure that it is known. Fuzzier rules would permit the easy transfer of property
interests envisioned by revised Article 9 and the securitization facilitation statutes
with a reduced possibility of secrecy. Fuzzy rules may permit liens while
inhibiting secrets.
There are undoubtedly other behavioral implications of notice-filing. The
important point here is that the system may have behavioral consequences that
have not been fully internalized by those proposing changes in policy.
Conclusion
This article has investigated the causes and effects of the elimination of
notice-filing from common commercial finance transactions, including those

344

Id. at 54-55. Malloy’s examples involve the conflicting disclosure pressures of federal
environmental and tax laws.
345

Id. at 55. There are, Malloy notes, important limits to this analysis. Among other things,
“accountability in the complex context of the business firm and regulatory environment is still
quite young.” Id. at 56.
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involving data, intellectual property and bank and brokerage accounts. The
principal cause appears to be excessive (or misplaced) concerns with economic
efficiency. The principal effect will be increased incidence of secret liens. This
article has suggested that secret liens may be a problem because they challenge
deeply held intuitions about the relationship between property rights and notice
obligations, reflected in both recent theoretical developments and long mercantile
history.
This article has suggested that notice-filing systems may perform at least two
important informational functions not fully considered by critics of these systems.
First, they will act as proxy for the information that might otherwise be generated
within tightly-knit merchant communities. Second, they may have important
behavioral consequences for both those required to provide the notice and the
audience for the information thus provided.
We may never fully understand the relationship between property,
information, community and investment (credit) decisions. It is, however,
important to remember that informational systems like the notice-filing system of
the Uniform Commercial Code perform a variety of functions which should not
be discarded lightly.
############################################
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Annex A

UCC FINANCING STATEMENT
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY

A. NAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER [optional]
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address)
Granada Bank and Trust Co., N.A.
25 South Harbor Street
Boston, MA 02110
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
1. DEBTOR’S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME – insert only one debtor name (1a or 1b) – do not abbreviate or combine names
1a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME
OR

Maimonedes Medical Finance Services LLC
1b. INDIVIDUAL’S LAST NAME

FIRST NAME

1c. MAILING ADDRESS

SSN OR EIN

ADD’L INFO RE
ORGANIZATION
DEBTOR

SUFFI

CITY

STATE

POSTAL CODE

COUN

02101

USA

Baltimore

MD

1e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

1f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION

1g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #, if any

LLC

Delaware

60 Boston Street
1d. TAX ID #:

MIDDLE NAME

NONE

2. ADDITIONAL DEBTOR’S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME – insert only one debtor name (2a or 2b) – do not abbreviate or combine names
2a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME
OR

2b. INDIVIDUAL’S LAST NAME’

FIRST NAME

Principal

Peter

2c. MAILING ADDRESS

622 University Avenue
2d. TAX ID #:

SSN OR EIN

ADD’L INFO RE
ORGANIZATION
DEBTOR

2e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

MIDDLE NAME

SUFFI

CITY

STATE

POSTAL CODE

COUN

Baltimore

MD

02120

USA

2f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION

2g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #, if any

3. SECURED PARTY’S NAME (or NAME of TOTAL ASSIGNEE OF ASSIGNOR S/P) – insert only one secured party name (3a or 3b)
3a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME
OR

Granada Bank and Trust Co, .N.A.
3b. INDIVIDUAL’S LAST NAME

FIRST NAME

MIDDLE NAME

SUFFI

3c. MAILING ADDRESS

CITY

STATE

POSTAL CODE

COUN

25 South Harbor Street

Boston

MA

02110

USA

4. This FINANCING STATEMENT covers the following collateral:

Equipment, inventory, chattel paper, accounts, general intangibles
5. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNATION [if applicable]:
6.

LESSEE/LESSOR

CONSIGNEE/CONSIGNOR
BAILEE/BAILOR
SELLER/BUYER
7. Check to REQUEST SEARCH REPORT(S) on Debtor(s)

This FINANCING STATEMENT is to be filed [for record] (or recorded) in the REAL
ESTATE RECORDS. Attach Addendum
(if applicable)
8. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA

[ADDITIONAL FEE]
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[optional]

All Debtors

AG. LIEN
Debtor 1

NON-UCC FIL
Debtor 2

The End of Notice
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